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CGE-Models
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This paper proposes a parsimonious and intuitive way to incorporate Melitz-type
firm heterogeneity in a CGE-model based on the conventional Armington trade
structure. The Armington trade structure is extended with demand, supply, and
trade cost shifters. Each sector can be modelled as either Melitz, Ethier-Krugman, or
Armington, depending on the specification chosen for the shifters. The trade struc-
ture of the model can be calibrated based on two estimable parameters: the trade or
tariff elasticity and the shape parameter of the size distribution of firms. With this
setup fixed and iceberg trade costs are calibrated jointly based on observed import
shares. The structure is incorporated within the standard GTAP model and changes
to the GEMPACK code are discussed in detail. Changes in both trade values and
welfare are decomposed. Experiments with global reductions in iceberg and fixed
trade costs are simulated in a medium-size model with 11 countries, 11 sectors, and
6 production factors. The experiments show that the welfare effects are largest un-
der Melitz, followed by Ethier-Krugman and Armington, although differences are
modest.
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1. Introduction
The standard approach to specifying the structure of import demand in CGE
models has been with the Armington assumption, featuring constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) preferences with love-of-variety for varieties originating from
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(indexed by) different source countries. Although intra-industry trade can be mod-
elled with the Armington assumption, products from each country are homoge-
neous and usually are produced under perfect competition with this approach,
which is unsatisfactory for several reasons. Krugman (1980) and Ethier (1982)
explain intra-industry trade in respectively final and intermediate goods combin-
ing love-of-variety in preferences, increasing returns to scale in production, and
monopolistic competition as market structure. Preferences are characterized by
love-of-variety between varieties produced by different firms. Intra-industry trade
emerges naturally from the desire of consumers to buy as many different varieties
and the benefits of sharing the fixed costs to develop new varieties through interna-
tional trade in this model. An increase in the amount of inputs leads to a more than
proportional increase in utility, because of love-of-variety. The Ethier-Krugman ap-
proach itself has been criticized because of the assumption that all firms are identi-
cal. Melitz (2003) introduces firm heterogeneity based on the basic Ethier-Krugman
approach, modelling productivity at firm level (the inverse of marginal costs) as
heterogeneous. The inclusion of firm heterogeneity adds realistic features that map
to evidence on links between firm size, firm performance, and productivity. It al-
lows for changes in productivity (new in the Melitz framework) and the number of
varieties (already part of the Ethier-Krugman framework). Firm heterogeneity also
provides an additional mechanism for welfare effects (gains and losses) from trade,
with the reallocation of within-sector market shares between less productive firms
producing for domestic markets and more productive exporting firms, and by the
reallocation of resources across sectors, which can also then lead to productivity
effects linked not only to earlier mechanisms, but also to changes in the collective
productivity characteristics of firms in a given sector as resources are shifted be-
tween sectors.
In this paper we map out a parsimonious representation of Melitz-type firm het-
erogeneity with a Pareto productivity distribution enabling incorporation in multi-
sector CGE models. In contrast to recent literature, our approach takes advantage
of reduced form representations of the basic Melitz model, making for easier nu-
merical implementation and compact analytical representation of the core drivers
linked to including Melitz-type model features in a multi-sector, multi-country nu-
merical model. Working with the representations we develop here, we show that
both the Ethier-Krugman and the Melitz model can be defined as an Armington
model by generalizing the expressions for iceberg trade costs and by including
supply and demand shifters (sector level, country indexed externalities in both pro-
duction and consumption) in the Melitz model. The Ethier-Krugman model also
features a supply shifter which is a function of the number of input bundles leading
to so-called variety scaling (Francois, 1998; Francois et al., 2013). An increase in the
number of input bundles in a sector reduces the average sectoral price and raises
effective output. This is driven by the presence of love-of-variety in preferences
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combined with fixed costs in production.1
Like the Ethier-Krugman model, variety scaling also props up in the Melitz
model. However, in addition the sector-level externality (the supply shifter), and
thus the average sectoral price, is a function of the price of input bundles as well.
The reason is that both the extensive and compositional margin are affected by the
price of input bundles. With a lower price of input bundles more firms can sell prof-
itably to the different destination markets generating a positive effect through the
extensive margin (more varieties) and a negative effect through the compositional
margin (lower average productivity because of the survival of the least productive
firms as well).2 For the same reason there is a demand shifter in the Melitz model:
in a larger market with a higher price index more firms can survive, raising the
beneficial extensive margin but also the harmful compositional margin. General-
ized iceberg trade costs are a function of fixed and iceberg trade costs and of tariffs.
We show theoretically that the Ethier-Krugman model is a special, limiting case of
the Melitz model for the firm size distribution becoming granular. Granularity cor-
responds with a trade elasticity in Melitz equal to the substitution elasticity minus
one. The reason for the nesting is that under granularity the destination-varying
component of the extensive margin cancels out against the compositional margin
leaving only the intensive margin and the number of entrants-component of the
extensive margin, the two channels also operative in Ethier-Krugman.
The trade structure of the firm heterogeneity model is calibrated based on two
estimable parameters, the tariff or trade elasticity and the shape parameter of the
firm size distribution. These two empirically identifiable parameters determine the
substitution elasticity and the shape parameter of the Pareto productivity distribu-
tion. Separate values for fixed and iceberg trade costs are not needed within our
framework and the two types of trade costs are calibrated jointly based on observed
import shares. In the GEMPACK implementation explicit values of trade costs are
not needed. Their implicit values serve to set baseline import shares equal to actual
shares.
In calibration we also have to deal with well-known problems in solving multi-
sector models with scale effects, the possibility of corner solutions and effects be-
coming infinitely large because of feedback loops through intermediate linkages.
Three approaches have been followed in the literature to address these problems.
1 As a point of clarification for the reader, underpinning the discussion in this section, and
in what follows as we develop our model(s), we keep the constant returns to scale features
of GTAP in terms of bundles of inputs (intermediates and value added) used in production.
Under constant returns these bundles map directly into output. With increasing returns,
fixed costs are specified in terms of bundles at the firm level, as are marginal costs. As
such, in both the Ethier-Krugman and Melitz specifications developed here, markups over
marginal cost are necessary to cover fixed costs measured in input bundles.
2 Head and Mayer (2014) introduced the distinction between the intensive, extensive, and
compositional margin in the context of the gravity model under international trade.
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First, imperfect mobility of production factors (Francois, 2001). Second, nested im-
port demand with a smaller substitution elasticity between imports and domestic
goods than between imports from different sources. Both options make the model
more convex and thus reduce the probability of corner solutions. Third, adjust-
ment of the data such that intermediate import shares are smoother. As discussed
in Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014) the latter option reduces the probability of
infinitely large effects. We incorporate the first two options in the code. We prefer
to stick to the original GTAP-data in calibrating the model and thus do not adjust
intermediate input shares in the data. In the simulation results we stick to a calibra-
tion with only imperfect mobility of labor (besides land and natural resources being
already imperfectly mobile), as we want to implement a structure with authentic
monopolistic competition between firms from different countries. We thus want to
work with the same substitution elasticity between varieties of firms produced in
all countries, as further motivated in Section 4.
We conduct numerical counterfactual experiments with our model in a medium-
sized model with 11 regions, 11 sectors, and 6 factors of production. We run three
sets of experiments with reductions in iceberg and fixed trade costs comparing the
three trade structures. First, a uniform identical reduction in iceberg trade costs in
the different models, and second and third an identical change in a hypothetical
dummy variable in the gravity equation implied by the three trade models for the
model calibrated to respectively the tariff and trade elasticity. For all three experi-
ments the reduction in iceberg trade costs generates the largest effects in the Melitz
model, followed by the Ethier-Krugman and Armington model. However, the dif-
ferences are relatively modest with the Melitz model displaying maximum 10%
larger welfare effects (measured as the change in world equivalent variation) of a
2% reduction in iceberg trade costs than the Armington model. The difference in
welfare effects is only about 2% between Melitz and Ethier-Krugman. The welfare
decomposition shows that the net contribution of the new margins due to changes
in average imported and domestic productivity and imported and domestic num-
ber of varieties is relatively modest.
We view our approach as complementary to earlier work in both the CGE-
and NQT-literature. Essentially, what we offer here is a hybrid, building on both
strands of the literature, In particular, our approach contributes to the existing lit-
erature in the following three ways. First, we present a parsimonious and intuitive
way to include firm heterogeneity in a CGE-model going along with straightfor-
ward estimation of the model parameters. By adding demand, supply, and trade
cost shifters to the existing trade structure used in most CGE-models (Armington)
we propose an intuitive and flexible way to switch between the different trade
structures.3 Second, with our framework we are able to conduct experiments with
3 Dixon et al. (2016) and Dixon et al. (2018) also introduce an encompassing model for the
three structures, but do not write the Melitz model as an Armington structure with only
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the Melitz and Ethier-Krugman structures in a CGE model with intermediate link-
ages and a large number of countries and sectors. In this paper we present simu-
lations with 11 regions, 11 sectors, and 6 factor of production. Third, we introduce
additional features in the model like a decomposition of changes in trade values
into three margins, a generalization of the CES utility function to separate the sub-
stitution elasticity and the strength of love-of-variety, and a welfare decomposition.
Relative to our companion paper, Bekkers and Francois (2018), we concentrate
in this paper on the technical details of the implementation within the GTAP frame-
work, the trade margin decomposition, and the welfare decomposition. We also
show how ad valorem equivalents can be calculated and incorporate simulations
with changes in policy variables estimated in a gravity model. The other paper
identifies the factors generating the largest differences between model outcomes
across models. However, the simulation results in the current manuscript also pro-
vide many valuable insights. We show that the ranking of models in terms of wel-
fare effects is the same as in previous literature, but the differences are much more
modest. This can be explained from the fact that we have implemented literal ver-
sions of the different models without extensions such as endogenous factor supply
as in Bekkers and Francois (2018) and different input bundles for fixed and variable
costs as in Akgul et al. (2016). The trade margin decomposition shows that changes
in the extensive and compositional margin are large relative to the total change in
trade, whereas the intensive margin is less important than in the Armington and
Ethier-Krugman models. The welfare decomposition shows that changes in aver-
age importer productivity and number of varieties and changes in domestic pro-
ductivity and number of varieties are large relative to the total change in welfare.
This illustrates numerically the size of the composition effect first identified in the
theoretical literature by Melitz (2003).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 goes into related literature, com-
paring our work with other approaches in the literature to incorporate firm het-
erogeneity in quantitative trade models. Section 3 outlines the theoretical structure
and points out how the three different trade structures can be modelled within the
existing trade structure in the GTAP model. Section 4 discusses calibration of the
model and Section 5 presents the results of counterfactual experiments. Section 6
concludes.
2. Related Literature
Both the new quantitative trade (NQT) literature and the CGE literature have
proposed ways to introduce firm heterogeneity in multi-sector multi-country mod-
demand and supply shifters. They include additional equations in the Melitz structure
to solve for example for the number of varieties and the average productivity, following
mostly the set of equilibrium equations in Balistreri et al. (2012). A more detailed discussion
of the differences with their work is included in the next section.
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els, mostly focusing on the question whether firm heterogeneity generates larger
welfare effects of different types of trade liberalization. In the CGE-literature vari-
ations in method are based on one of four basic approaches to including firm het-
erogeneity, discussed here in chronological order. Zhai (2008) is the first CGE-
implementation of firm heterogeneity. Zhai (2008) follows the Melitz-setup with
a Pareto productivity distribution and calibrates the model to GTAP Version 6.2
data with 11 sectors and 12 regions and finds that the welfare effects of tariff liber-
alization under Melitz are twice as large as under Armington. Crucially, however,
Zhai (2008) abstracts from endogenous entry and exit, imposing a fixed number of
entrants in each sector. This switches off entry and exit effects.
Second, Balistreri et al. (2012) have included firm heterogeneity in one sector
in a CGE model with other sectors characterized by an Armington trade structure
working with GAMS. They follow exactly the Melitz-Pareto structure and allow for
an endogenous number of entrants. Balistreri et al. (2012) iterate between solving
the equilibrium equations of the Melitz-sector and the general equilibrium equa-
tions of the entire economy. Employing the same structure, Balistreri et al. (2010)
argue that the welfare effects are an order of magnitude larger under firm hetero-
geneity than under Armington when factor supply is endogenous. Balistreri et al.
(2012) structurally estimate the parameters of their model, in particular the fixed
export costs. We discuss differences with Balistreri et al. (2012) in terms of cali-
bration in Section 4 on calibration. Britz and Jafari (2017) have implemented the
model structure in Balistreri et al. (2012) in the GAMS-version of the GTAP-model,
CGEBox, allowing for the Akgul et al. (2016)-feature discussed below that fixed
costs bundles use only value added. Britz and Jafari (2017) present an example
application of a 50% tariff and export subsidy reduction with a 10x10 aggregation
of the GTAP8 database. They find like Balistreri et al. (2012) that welfare effects
under Melitz are much larger, a factor four, than under Armington. To prevent
corner-solutions they propose a change in intermediate firm demand with firms
not demanding domestic intermediate input bundles from their own sector. It is
not exactly clear how this is implemented and/or whether this goes along with an
adjustment of the baseline data.
Third, Akgul et al. (2016) include firm heterogeneity in the GTAP-model (using
GEMPACK) extending the standard model first with variety effects and increasing
returns to scale to obtain a model of monopolistic competition (Ethier-Krugman)
and then with productivity effects to obtain a model of firm heterogeneity. As such
Akgul et al. (2016) also nest Armington, Ethier-Krugman, and Melitz in the GTAP
model, although in a different way than we do. Akgul et al. (2016) also include a
welfare decomposition, extending the standard decomposition in Huff and Hertel
(2000). Akgul et al. (2016) employ a structure where input bundles used in fixed
and variable costs are different. In particular, following the approach in Swami-
nathan and Hertel (1996), they assume that fixed costs only use the factors labor
and capital and no intermediates. Akgul et al. (2016) find that the global welfare
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effects of trade liberalization are a factor 10 larger in their firm heterogeneity model
than in the Armington model. As pointed out in Akgul et al. (2016) the assump-
tion of fixed cost bundles consisting only of labor and capital implies that strong
scale effects from trade liberalization emerge. Reductions in the price of intermedi-
ate inputs as a result of trade liberalization drive down the price of variable costs
relative to fixed costs, thus raising the average size of firms. The much larger ef-
fects in the Melitz model is, however, also partially the result of another feature
of the model, which differs from the Melitz setup, as also observed in Dixon et al.
(2018). Akgul et al. (2016) define an average productivity for each exporting coun-
try, which determines the average export price, whereas in the Melitz model the
average productivity determining the bilateral export price is exporter-importer
specific. Hence, in Akgul et al. (2016) the average exporter productivity is not
destination specific. This setup in Akgul et al. (2016) reduces the negative com-
positional effect, as export prices are only indirectly affected by the reduction in
average export productivity (through its impact on the average productivity to all
destinations) when it becomes cheaper to export in response to for example tariff
liberalization. To explore the impact of this feature in Akgul et al. (2016), Dixon
et al. (2018) deviate in Appendix 7.3 of their book from their main implementation
of the Melitz model. In particular, on the basis of Akgul et al. (2016), they incor-
porate an exporter-specific cutoff productivity which does not vary by destination
country. Phrased differently, the cutoff productivity is only varying by exporter
and identical for all destination countries. They find that the welfare effects of a
tariff experiment roughly double as a result of this change. As such this feature
seems to explain a part of the much larger welfare effects in Akgul et al. (2016). Al-
though the evidence in Dixon et al. (2018) looks convincing on this point, we also
observe that they seem to switch off the free entry condition when implementing
the model in Akgul et al. (2016). This leads to an incorrect representation of this
model, since Akgul et al. (2016) do include a (sector-level) free entry condition.4
Hence, we conclude by observing that there are various potential explanations for
the much larger welfare effects under firm heterogeneity in Akgul et al. (2016), but
that it is difficult to identify the exact mechanism.
Fourth, Dixon et al. (2016) propose a way to model the Melitz, Ethier-Krugman,
and Armington structure in one encompassing model using GEMPACK. They ar-
gue that welfare effects are similar in the three structures if trade elasticities are
adjusted such that trade responses to tariff changes are similar. Simulations are
presented in a 2 country 2 commodity setting with identical industries and with-
out intermediate linkages in Dixon et al. (2016). Hence, they do not calibrate the
model in a complete CGE-structure with intermediate linkages and multiple dif-
4 Technically, Dixon et al. (2018) endogenize the variable dcolrevxsd,c, thus switching off the
free entry condition.
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ferent sectors to real-world data.5
Dixon et al. (2018) extend the work of Dixon et al. (2016) significantly by incor-
porating the Melitz structure into the standard GTAP model. In their book Dixon
et al. (2018) outline the general structure of the Melitz firm heterogeneity model as
in Balistreri et al. (2012), address welfare distortions in the Melitz model, outline
how the Armington model can be extended to a Melitz model, discuss calibration,
and map out how their structure can be incorporated into the GTAP-model. As
such Dixon et al. (2018) and our work are significantly related. Nevertheless, there
are significant differences between the two approaches in terms of model setup, cal-
ibration, and implementation, such that both approaches provide significant and
independent contributions to the literature on firm heterogeneity in CGE-models.
There are at least three differences within each of these characteristics of the model.
First, our model differs substantially in terms of model setup with at least three
differences. First and most important, we work with a demand shifter, supply
shifter, and generalized iceberg trade costs to eliminate the bilateral cutoff produc-
tivity and numbers of firms from the model and the non-linear zero cutoff profit
condition, free entry condition and factor (labor) market equilibrium. Dixon et al.
(2018) instead keep all the equilibrium conditions of the Melitz model and by re-
formulating their model stay still close to the original implementation in Balistreri
et al. (2012). By eliminating the non-linear equations from the model and most
of the bilateral equations (except for generalized iceberg trade costs), our expo-
sition is computationally more tractable which enables us to solve medium-sized
models with Melitz in all sectors without problems.6 The second model setup dif-
ference is in the scope of the model. We nest both Ethier-Krugman and Melitz
within the Armington structure of the GTAP-model, whereas in the extension of
the GTAP-model Dixon et al. (2018) only nest the Melitz model. As such we are
able to pinpoint exactly how the Armington model extends step-by-step to first
an Ethier-Krugman model featuring variety effects (destination-generic for each
supplying country) and then to a Melitz model featuring also productivity effects
and destination-specific variety effects. Furthermore, our model allows for nested
Armington preferences with a different (lower) substitution elasticity between do-
mestic and imported varieties than between imports from different exporters and
also firms in the monopolistic competition versions of the model, as in Feenstra
et al. (2018) and Caliendo et al. (2015). Finally, we allow for a generalized way to
model the strength of love of variety as in Jung (2015) and Felbermayr and Jung
(2015) determined by a separate parameter distinct from the substitution elasticity.
5 Itakura and Oyamada (2013) and Oyamada (2015) implement the Dixon et al. (2016) code
in a calibrated model, but do not seem to move beyond a small number of countries and
sectors and assume like Balistreri et al. (2012) only firm heterogeneity in one of the sectors.
6 In larger models with more sectors, corner solutions start to play a role with values in
small sectors tending to zero or even negative. How we deal with these problems is dis-
cussed into detail in Section 4.
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The third difference in model setup relates to the welfare decomposition. We ex-
tend the existing welfare decomposition of the GTAP model as presented in Huff
and Hertel (2000), whereas Dixon et al. (2018) set up their own decomposition fo-
cusing on the role of inter-sectoral reallocation of resources. We add productivity
and variety terms to the existing welfare decomposition, aligning with the intuition
on which additional effects Melitz and Ethier-Krugman introduce.
A second set of differences lies in the calibration of baseline and parameters.
Like Dixon et al. (2018) we eliminate the shares spent on fixed costs and entry
costs in baseline calibration and hence don’t need baseline values for these shares.
How this approach compares with the earlier approach in Balistreri et al. (2012)
is explained very clearly in Chapter 4 of Dixon et al. (2018). As a first difference
in calibration, we go one step further as we calibrate the model without baseline
values for domestic and exporting cutoff productivity7 by eliminating the cutoff
productivities writing them as functions of other endogenous variables and pa-
rameters as further explained into detail below. Second, we calibrate the structural
parameters, the substitution elasticity and the shape parameters of the productiv-
ity distribution to empirically estimable parameters, the trade or tariff elasticity
and the shape parameter of firm size distribution. whereas Dixon et al. (2018) take
values from the literature for the substitution elasticity and the firm productivity
shape parameter. Third, when comparing the different trade structures (Arming-
ton, Ethier-Krugman, and Melitz), we impose that the empirically estimable pa-
rameters of the model (based on a gravity equation structurally derived directly
from the model) are identical in the two models, whereas Dixon et al. (2018) cal-
ibrate the model to the structural parameters and discuss the idea (in Chapter 6)
that the substitution elasticity in the Armington and Melitz model should be such
that the sensitivity of trade to tariffs is equivalent. This position is taken more
explicitly in Dixon et al. (2016). We instead contend that the empirically estimable
parameters in the different models, in particular the trade or tariff elasticity, should
be identical, with implied differences in the structural elasticities of the model.
A third set of differences with Dixon et al. (2018) concerns the implementation
of the Melitz firm heterogeneity model. A first difference in this regard is that we
present simulations with a Melitz trade structure in all (eleven) sectors, whereas
Dixon et al. (2018) present results with Melitz present in only one (of the 57) sectors.
Although this generates interesting results on the importance for welfare of sectoral
reallocation of resources towards sectors with variety and scale effects, these results
have been discussed at length in the new economic geography literature and also
in Arkolakis et al. (2012). Balistreri et al. (2010) make a similar point based on the
same mechanism, i.e. that welfare effects in a monopolistic competition model with
scale and variety effects are much larger than in a model with perfect competition
if factor supply can be increased in sectors with a monopolistic competition struc-
7 The cutoff productivity is called minimum productivity in Dixon et al. (2018).
9
Journal of Global Economic Analysis, Volume 3 (2018), No. 2, pp. 1-68.
ture. In Dixon et al. (2018) this is about intersectoral reallocation of factor supply,
whereas in Balistreri et al. (2010) it is about total factor supply. Our work instead
incorporates a Melitz structure in an arbitrary number of sectors in medium-sized
models without computational problems as a result of our parsimonious structure.
Second and related to the previous point, we propose different ways to address
computational problems and avoid corner solutions by convexifying the model
both with imperfect mobility of labor and nested trade preferences. We also dis-
cuss the merits of other options in the literature. Third, we present a decomposition
of trade values into the intensive, extensive, and compositional margin in response
to different types of trade cost shocks.
In the NQT literature, two papers are particularly related to our work. First,
Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014) also nest the Armington, Ethier-Krugman,
and Melitz trade structures in one framework and examine the different welfare
effects of trade and changes in tariffs. Their approach differs from ours in the way
they create the nesting of the different models and in the distinction between the
different margins. We work with an intensive, extensive, and compositional mar-
gin, whereas Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014) introduce an intensive, selec-
tion, and entry extensive margin. Furthermore, we show that the Melitz model
approaches the Ethier-Krugman model when the firm size distribution becomes
granular. Second, Caliendo et al. (2015) explore the effects of tariff liberalization
in the Melitz model in a setting with 189 countries and 15 sectors, focusing on the
additional welfare effects of the entry of firms. Both quantitative trade models fea-
ture multiple sectors and intermediate linkages (and Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare
(2014) also multiple production factors), but omit capital accumulation, different fi-
nal users, and non-homothetic preferences as in CGE models.8 Also, they do not
consider changes in fixed or iceberg trade costs, focusing instead on the effects of
tariffs and on comparing trade with autarky.
3. Model
We start with the standard static GTAP model. To model the Armington, Ethier-
Krugman, and Melitz model in one structure we add three components to the equa-
tions for international trade in the GTAP model: a demand shifter, a supply shifter,
and a trade cost shifter (also called generalized iceberg trade costs). Depending on
the specification of these three components, we can nest the three models within
a single structure. The first subsection discusses how the existing trade equations
are modified by including the supply and demand shifters. Then we present the
expressions for the demand, supply, and trade cost shifters in the three models.
After that we discuss the parameters added to the parameter file to capture the
8 Also, this literature typically abstracts from a transport sector and assumes that con-
sumers and firms demand the same bundle of goods from each sector, thus imposing that
import and domestic shares are identical for these different groups.
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three models with one code. The parameters are used to calibrate the different
models, but also to determine the shift between the different market structures per
sector. We continue by outlining in detail the blocks added to the GEMPACK code
to model the shifters, in turn the supply shifter, the demand shifter, and the trade
cost shifter. We finish this section describing how two decompositions are mod-
elled, first the decomposition of the value of trade into intensive, extensive, and
compositional margin and second the extensions to the welfare decomposition in
the GTAP model. Equivalence between our exposition of the Melitz model with
demand, supply and trade cost shifters and the original Melitz model is outlined
in Appendix C in a basic two-country model, both for expositional purposes and
to show equivalence between the two approaches with numerical simulations.
3.1 Modifying International Trade in the GTAP Model
In the standard GTAP there are four types of agents (or end users) in country s :
private households with superscript pr, government with superscript go, investors
with superscript in, and firms from sector j with superscript f ij. We assume the
reader is familiar with the structure of the GTAP model.9 Each of the agents divide
their demand in sector i, qagis , into domestic demand, q
d,ag
is , and import demand,
qm,agis , according to a CES utility function with substitution elasticity ρ:
qagis =
((
qd,agis
) ρi−1
ρi +
(
qm,agis
) ρi−1
ρi
) ρi
ρi−1
(1)
Total import demand, qmis , consists of the sum over the four groups of agents,
qmis = ∑
ag
qm,agis , and is in turn allocated across demand from the different sourcing
countries, qirs, according to a CES utility function, featuring a demand-shifter, ems :
qmis = e
m
is
(
S
∑
r=1
(qirs)
σi−1
σi
) σi
σi−1
(2)
The demand shifter emis will differ from 1 in the Melitz model. Import demand can
be written as follows:
qirs = (emis )
σi−1
(
pirs
pmis
)−σi
qmis = (e
m
is )
σi−1
 tirstairs p
ci f
irs
cmir
pmis

−σi
qmis (3)
9 We refer to for example Hertel (1997), Corong et al. (2017), and Bekkers et al. (2018) for
a description of the general structure of the GTAP-model. We describe here only the parts
of the model that are changed by extending the model with monopolistic competition and
firm heterogeneity.
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tirs are the (generalized) iceberg trade costs, cmir is a supply shifter, p
ci f
irs is the cif-
price, exclusive of the iceberg trade costs, and tairs are the bilateral tariffs. pirs is the
price of qirs, hence the cif-price inclusive of tariffs, iceberg trade costs and a supply
shifter. pmis is the price index of total import demand, q
m
is , and defined as:
pmis =
 S∑
r=1
(
tirstairs p
ci f
irs
cmir e
m
is
)1−σi 11−σi (4)
Hat differentiating equation (3) generates the corresponding expression in the GTAP
code. As in the standard code we need the quantity in physical units (to be used in
the calculation of tax revenues) and therefore multiply the quantity qirs by iceberg
trade costs, tirs, and divide by the supply shifter, cmir . In GEMPACK notation we
get:
Equation IMPORTDEMAND
# regional demand for disaggregated imported commodities by source #
(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
qxs(i,r,s) = - ams(i,r,s) - sshiftx(i,r) - dshiftm(i,s) + qim(i,s) - ESUBM(i)
* [pms(i,r,s) - ams(i,r,s) - sshiftx(i,r) - dshiftm(i,s) - pim(i,s)];
ams(i,r,s) is formally the technology shifter in international trade, and defined as
minus the relative change in iceberg trade costs. We will endogenize the expres-
sion for ams(i,r,s) in the Melitz version of the model. sshiftx(i,r) is the supply shifter,
ĉmir , and dshiftm(i,s) is the demand shifter, ê
m
is . pms(i,r,s) is the landed price, i.e. the
cif-price inclusive of tariffs, ̂tairs pci firs . Variables with a hat indicate relative or per-
centage changes. Hence, compared to the standard code, our equation for import
demand is extended with both a demand- and supply-shifter.
Equation (4) corresponds with the expression for the price of imports in the
code:
Equation DPRICEIMP
# price for aggregate imports #
(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,s,REG)
pim(i,s) = sum(k,REG, MSHRS(i,k,s) * [pms(i,k,s) - ams(i,k,s) -
sshiftx(i,k) - dshiftm(i,s)]);
MSHRS(i,k,s) is the importer market share from exporter region k in importer
region s. Hence this expression is also extended with a supply shifter cmir and a
demand shifter emis compared to the standard code.
qd,agis also features a demand shifter and domestic demand, q
d,ag
iss , is given by
qd,agis = e
d
isq
d,ag
iss . We can thus express q
d,ag
iss as follows:
10
10 qd,agiss is the domestic equivalent of qirs and therefore we can write q
d,ag
is = e
d
isq
d,ag
iss . Utility
maximization leads to qd,agis =
(
pd,agis
pagis
)
qagis , which implies in turn equation (5) by using
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qd,agiss =
(
edis
)ρ−1( pd,agiss
pagis
)−ρi
qagis =
(
eds
)ρi−1 ta
d,ag
is tpis p
ib
is
cdis
pagis

−ρi
qagis (5)
pibis is the domestic production price or the price of input bundles, c
d
is is the domes-
tic supply shifter, tad,agis and tpis are respectively the group specific import tariffs
and the production taxes, and pagis is the price index corresponding with aggregate
sectoral demand of group ag, qagis , and defined as:
pagis =
( tad,agis tpis pibis
edisc
d
is
)1−ρi
+
(
tam,agis p
m
is
)1−ρi 11−ρi (6)
Since the demand and supply shifters are already part of pmis they only appear in
the domestic price part.
Hat differentiating the expression for domestic demand in (5) leads to the fol-
lowing expression in GEMPACK notation:
Equation GHHLDDOM
# government consumption demand for domestic goods #
(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,s,REG)}
qgd(i,s) = - dshiftd(i,s) - sshiftd(i,s) + qg(i,s)
- ESUBD(i) * [pgd(i,s) - dshiftd(i,s) - sshiftd(i,s) - pg(i,s)];
Equation (5) holds for all four groups of agents, ag = go, pr, f i and here we
have only displayed the expression for government demand, qgd(i,s). The expres-
sions for qpd(i,s) and qfd(i,j,s) are equivalent. As in the expression for import de-
mand we have divided domestic government demand, qd,gois , by the supply shifter,
cdis, to get the quantity in physical units. pgd(i,s) is the domestic price inclusive of
the government-specific import tariff, corresponding with ̂tad,gois tpis pibis . pg(i,s) cor-
responds with p̂ggois . dshiftd(i,s) and sshiftd(i,s) are the domestic demand and supply
shifters, respectively êdis and ĉ
d
is.
Hat differentiating the price index for group ag in equation (6) generates for
ag = go in GEMPACK-notation (with GMSHR(i,s) the share spent on imported
goods):
Equation GCOMPRICE
# government consumption price for composite commodities #
(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,s,REG)
pg(i,s) = GMSHR(i,s) * (pgm(i,s)) + [1 - GMSHR(i,s)] * (pgd(i,s)
- dshiftd(i,s) - sshiftd(i,s));
qd,agis = e
d
isq
d,ag
iss and p
d,ag
is =
pd,agiss
edis
.
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3.2 Modelling Armington, Ethier-Krugman, and Melitz
This subsection presents the three trade structures and the theoretical expres-
sions for the demand, supply, and trade cost shifters. The implementation in the
code is presented in the next subsections. Formal derivations of expressions for the
different shifters can be found in Appendix A.
3.2.1 Armington
The Armington model is the default trade structure in the standard GTAP model.
Goods are differentiated by country of origin and all goods produced by the same
country are homogeneous. This means that all goods from country r imported by
country s have the same price as modelled in the previous subsection with the de-
mand and supply shifters, eis and cir, equal to one (and the corresponding variables
in the code in relative changes equal to zero). The trade cost shifter, tirs, is equal to
plain iceberg trade costs, τirs. To model iceberg trade costs explicitly in the code,
we include the variable itc(i,r,s) with ams(i,r,s)=-itc(i,r,s) in the Armington world.
3.3 Ethier-Krugman
The Ethier-Krugman model combines love-of-variety in consumption, increas-
ing returns in production, and monopolistic competition as market structure. Util-
ity of agent ag in country s is a CES aggregate over the different varieties ω ∈ Ωirs
produced in r and consumed in s. The dual price index can be written as an aggre-
gate over the price of the varieties, po (ω):
(
pagis
)1−ρi =
Mνi−1is S∑
r=1
∫
ω∈Ωirs
pag,o (ω)1−σi dω

1−ρi
1−σi
+
Mνi−1is ∫
ω∈Ωdis
pag,o (ω)1−σi dω

1−ρi
1−σi
(7)
pagis could be price index of private household and government consumption or
of intermediate input demand of one of the sectors, both featuring love-of-variety.
Krugman (1980) focused on trade in final goods, whereas Ethier (1982) emphasized
trade in intermediates. Since the GTAP model features both final goods and inter-
mediates, we talk about the Ethier-Krugman model.
To separate the strength of love of variety from the substitution elasticity, we
include the term Mis in the utility function as in Benassy (1996), Ardelean (2007),
Jung (2015), and Felbermayr and Jung (2015). Mis is destination-specific and equal
to the number consumed varieties in country s, equal to the sum of domestic and
imported varieties. With νi = 1 the utility function collapses to the standard CES
14
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and a smaller νi weakens the strength of love-of-variety.11
Firms produce under increasing returns to scale with identical fixed cost air and
marginal costs bir. Combining increasing returns to scale in production with love-
of-variety preferences implies that an increase in the number of input bundles used
in production leads to a more than proportional increase in utility, since more va-
rieties can be produced. Phrased differently marginal costs at the aggregate level
(for the entire sector) fall in the number of input bundles. This can be modelled
by a supply shifter csoir (with so = d, m) falling in the number of input bundles.
Combining markup pricing, free entry, and factor market equilibrium generates
the following expression for cir (with γek,i a function of σi):
csoir = γek,i
(
q˜ibir
air
) 1
σi−1
(8)
q˜ibir is nearly proportional to the number of input bundles, q
ib
ir .
12 So the supply shifter
rises with the number of input bundles relative to fixed costs. More input bundles
relative to fixed costs implies that more varieties can be produced and given the
love of variety in both consumption and production (for intermediates) this leads
to a more than proportional increase in variety-scaled output.13
Due to the presence of a transport sector we cannot write the number of varieties
from country r, Nir, exactly as a function of the number input bundles, qibir , and we
have to subtract a term which is a function of the amount of transport services
11 In particular, with νi = 0 love of variety would disappear. The cited literature argues that
the strength of love of variety should be separately determined from the ease with which
varieties are substituted. Empirical work by Ardelean (2007) suggests that the strength
of love of variety is smaller than what is implied by the standard CES utility function.
We follow the specification in Felbermayr and Jung (2015) with the strength of the love of
variety being destination specific.
12 Equation (8) is derived in Appendix A.1.
13 Marginal costs do not play a role in the supply shifter, since they affect the cost of pro-
duction directly and in the same way as in the Armington model.
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paid:14
q˜ibir = q
ib
ir −
σi − 1
σi
 S∑
s=1
Nirrirs
tpir pibir tairs
(
teirs +
ptsirs
tpir pibir a
ts
irs
) − Nirrirs
tpir pibir tairs
 (9)
rirs are the per-firm revenues net of the group-specific import tariffs. As discussed
below, inclusion of the additional term on the RHS of equation (9) has only a
marginal effect on the simulation results.
To capture the additional love-of-variety term, Mis, the demand-shifter esois is
written as a function of the number of input bundles from all trading partners:
esois =
(
S
∑
r=1
q˜ibir
air
) νi−1
σi−1
(10)
Since fixed costs are not destination-specific, varieties are shipped to all trading
partners. Therefore, the number of varieties in the Ethier-Krugman model does
not vary by destination country and the expression on the RHS in equation (10)
does not vary by country. Therefore, this term could also have been included in the
supply-shifter. Putting this term in the demand-shifter makes it easier to switch
between the Ethier-Krugman and the Melitz model, as in the Melitz model the
additional love-of-variety term varies by country as a result of destination-specific
fixed trade costs. The absence of destination-specific fixed costs also implies that
the trade cost shifter, tirs, is equal to iceberg trade costs, τirs.
3.4 Melitz
Demand under Melitz is like under Ethier-Krugman described by equation (7)
with love-of-variety between varieties produced by different firms. The cost func-
tion is also identical, except for the fact that marginal costs, or its inverse produc-
tivity, ϕ, is heterogeneous across firms. Firms get to know their productivity upon
paying sunk entry costs, enir, by drawing from a known distribution Gir (ϕ). We
work with a Pareto distribution with shape parameter θi and size parameter κir:
Gir (ϕ) = 1−
κθiir
ϕθi
(11)
14 Nir follows from the free entry condition together with factor market equilibrium. Be-
cause separate input bundles are used to produce transport services, employed in each
sector, we have to subtract the demand for these bundles to calculate demand for input
bundles from a specific sector in a specific country. The result is that for given zero-profit-
revenues higher transport costs generate less labor demand. The implication is that a
higher sharer of transport costs implies that an increase in the number of input bundles
has a bigger impact on the number of varieties.
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Firms are subject to a fixed death probability δ and there is a steady state of entry
and exit with the mass of entering and exiting firms identical.15 Firms producing in
country r and selling in country s pay both iceberg trade costs τirs and fixed export
costs firs. For technical reasons we assume that the productivity level ϕ applies
both to production and transportation costs, implying that more productive firms
also require less transport services. Without this assumption the model would be-
come intractable. Fixed costs are paid in input bundles of the exporting country. In
our setting with multiple end users, importing country specific input bundles for
fixed costs would lead to ambiguity as to which input bundles should be used and
therefore we stick to the assumption that fixed costs are paid in terms of exporting
country bundles.
To determine the equilibrium price index we can impose an ex post zero cut-
off profit condition (after firms know their productivity), an ex ante free entry
condition (before drawing productivity), and factor market equilibrium. Like in
the Ethier-Krugman model the combination of love-of-variety preferences with in-
creasing returns to scale in production implies that marginal costs at the sectoral
level fall with the number of input bundles, modelled by the supply shifter rising
in the number of input bundles. However, sectoral marginal costs are now also af-
fected by the price of input bundles. To make this clear we use the decomposition
of changes in trade in Head and Mayer (2014) into an intensive margin, extensive
margin, and compositional margin. An increase in the price of input bundles re-
duces trade along the intensive margin as in the Armington and Ethier-Krugman
model, so is captured by the impact of pci firs and p
ib
ir for respectively importer and
domestic demand in equations (3) and (5). However, in the Melitz model there are
two additional effects. Higher priced input bundles reduce the number of firms
exporting, the extensive margin effect. As a result sectoral exports fall. This occurs
because input bundles used in both marginal costs and fixed export costs are more
expensive. But higher priced input bundles also imply that less productive firms
cannot export anymore, the compositional margin effect. And as a result exports
rise again. On net the extensive margin dominates the compositional margin. The
extensive and compositional margin effects are captured by the impact of the price
of input bundles on the supply shifter, as specified in the following equations (with
γm,i a function of σi and θi):
15 The number of entrants is constant in the absence of shocks. In case of shocks to exoge-
nous variables or parameters, such as to the number of workers or iceberg trade costs, the
number of entrants will change.
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cmir = γm,i
(
κθiir q˜
ib
ir
δenir
) 1
σi−1 (
tpir pibir
)− θi−σi+1
(σi−1)
2
(12)
cdir = γm,i
(
κθiir q˜
ib
ir
δenir
) 1
σi−1 (
tpir pibir
)− σi(θi−σi+1)
(σi−1)
2
(13)
q˜ibir is defined as in the Ethier-Krugman model in equation (9). The coefficient p
ib
ir
differs for the domestic and import supply shifter. The reason is that the coefficient
on pibir in the domestic supply shifter captures the impact on the extensive relative to
the compositional margin through the price of bundles used in both marginal and
fixed costs, whereas the coefficient on pibir in the import supply shifter only captures
the impact through the price of bundles used in fixed costs. The impact through
marginal costs of the extensive relative to the compositional margin adjustment
will be captured in the trade cost shifter.
The trade cost shifter is also affected by the three margins of adjustment and is
given by the following expression:
tirs =
(pci firs ) θi−σi+1σi−1 τ θi−σi+1σi−1irs ta
θi−σi+1
σi−1 +
θi−σi+1
(σi−1)
2
irs f
θi−σi+1
(σi−1)
2
irs
 τirs (14)
The last term outside of the brackets represents the impact of iceberg trade costs
on the intensive margin, like in the other two models. In the Melitz model, iceberg
trade costs also have an impact through the extensive and compositional margin,
corresponding with the second term within brackets. For the same reason the cif-
price, pci firs , bilateral tariffs, tais, the fixed costs, firs, also appears between brackets.
We see that larger iceberg and fixed trade costs raise generalized trade costs, tirs, if
θi > σi− 1, corresponding with the extensive margin effect dominating the compo-
sitional margin effect, as will be discussed further in the subsection on trade margin
decomposition.
The demand-side shifter in the Melitz model is also driven by the strength of
the extensive margin relative to the compositional margin. In a market with a large
effective market size (larger price indices pagis and p
so
is and larger expenditures E
ag
is )
more firms can profitably sell, so both the extensive margin and the compositional
margin are larger. The demand shifter for source so = d, m is thus defined as:
esois = M
νi−1
σi−1
is
∑
ag
Mνi−1is
(
pagis
taso,agis p
so
is
)ρi−1 (psois )σi−1 Eagis
taso,agis

θi−σi+1
(σi−1)
2
(15)
Mis is equal to the sum of the number of varieties from all sourcing countries and
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Table 1. Parameterization of the four models
Name Min Max Use ARM ETK MEL
VARS 0 1 Variety scaling 0 1 1
ETK 0 1 Ethier-Krugman 0 1 0
GRAN ξ 0 1 Granularity 1 1 < 1
ETIL εv,ta − − Tariff elasticity
ETRA εv,τ − − Trade elasticity
CATA 0 1 Dummy to switch
between εv,ta and εv,τ
PRSD υ 1 − Ratio σ and ρ
NU ν 0 1 Love-of-variety
Notes: The parameter names ar further defined in the main text.
Source: Authors own elaboration of parsimonious firm heterogeneity model.
defined in Appendix B. There is only one demand-shifter for the different groups
of agents ag. The reason is that exporter fixed costs are not agent specific. Upon
paying the fixed costs to sell in destination market s, we assume that they are able
to sell to all end users. So, the effective market size determining how many firms
are able to sell in the market consists of the sum of demands by the different groups
of agents.
3.5 New Parameters in the Model
We add the eight parameters in Table 1 to the parameter file, which are all sector-
specific. These parameters are used to switch between the different models and
parameterize the model, using empirically observable parameters. Some of the
behavioral parameters employed in the code are functions of these parameters.
We have decided to switch between models through changes in the parameter file
instead of closure swaps in the command file. Although there are only a small
number of additions to the core code, the trade and welfare decompositions imply
quite a large number of equations that are model-dependent, thus implying quite a
large number of swaps. Working with parameter values to switch between models
is therefore easier. Since the same equations would apply for the three different
models if we would switch between the models using closure swaps instead of
changes in the parameter file, we would get the same results.
Before introducing the parameters, we first observe that if the granularity pa-
rameter ξi =
σi−1
θi
would go to 1 the model would approach so-called full granu-
larity with θi = σi − 1. Under full granularity the Melitz model collapses to the
Ethier-Krugman model. However, full granularity is a limiting case of the Melitz
model, since average firm sales and other aggregates would not be defined any-
more. In turn switching off variety scaling the two monopolistic competition mod-
els fall back to Armington. The first three parameters in Table 1 enable us to switch
between the different models, and the last six parameters (from GRAN to NU)
determine the parameterization of the model:
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1) The parameter VARS (i) determines whether there is variety-scaling with
VARS (i) = 1 corresponding with variety scaling. Hence, in both the
Ethier-Krugman and the Melitz model this parameter is equal to 1 and
in the Armington model it is equal to 0.
2) ETK (i) is a dummy variable indicating that the sector is Ethier-Krugman.
We need this dummy variable for the model with the love-of-variety term,
Mis, and for the trade decomposition. Equivalence between Melitz under
granularity and Ethier-Krugman breaks down in this case. Moreover, the
decomposition of the value of trade into intensive, extensive, and compo-
sitional margin is not identical under Melitz approaching granularity and
under Ethier-Krugman.
3) GRAN (i) is the degree of granularity introduced in equation (18). To
model a sector as either Armington or Ethier-Krugman, GRAN (i) should
be set equal to 1.
4) ETIL (i) is the estimated tariff elasticity, the elasticity of the value of trade
with respect to the power of the tariff.
5) ETRADE (i) is the estimated trade elasticity, the elasticity of the value of
trade with respect to iceberg trade costs.
6) CATA (i) is a dummy variable indicating whether the model is calibrated
to the tariff elasticity (CATA (i) = 1) or to the trade elasticity (CATA (i) =
0).
7) PRSD (i) is measure for the degree of nestedness of preferences equal to
ESUBM (i) /ESUBD (i). The lower-nest substitution elasticity between
varieties from different sourcing countries, ESUBM (i), is determined by
the estimated tariff or trade elasticity and the degree of granularity. Hence,
PRSD (i) determines ρi (ESUBD (i)) and a larger PRSD (i) corresponds
with a smaller upper-nest elasticity ρi (between domestic and imported
varieties).
8) NU (i) determines the strength of love of variety. νi = 1 corresponds with
normal CES preferences and νi = 0 completely switches off love of variety.
Four behavioral parameters in the code are affected by the parameters in 1. In
the Armington and Ethier-Krugman model we need values for the substitution
elasticities parameters, σi and ρi, and the love of variety parameter, νi. In the Melitz
model we also need values for the shape parameter, θi. These parameters corre-
spond in the code respectively with ESUBM(i), ESUBD(i), NU(i), and THETA(i).
From the empirics we have estimates for the tariff elasticity εv,tai or the trade elas-
ticity εv,τi and the degree of granularity ξi, defined in the Melitz model as:
16
16 The tariff elasticity is derived in Subsection 4.1.
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εv,tai = θi + 1+
θi − σi + 1
σi − 1 (16)
εv,τi = θi (17)
ξi =
σi − 1
θi
(18)
We can thus express θi and σi as a function of ε
v,ta
i and ξi as follows if we calibrate
to the tariff elasticity:
σi = ξi ∗ εv,tai (19)
θi = ε
v,ta
i −
1
ξi
(20)
In the Armington and Ethier-Krugman model the tariff elasticity εv,tai is equal to the
substitution elasticity σi with ξi = 1.
If we calibrate to the trade elasticity, we get:
σi = ξε
v,τ
i + 1 (21)
θi = ε
v,τ
i (22)
In the Armington and Ethier-Krugman model the trade elasticity εv,τi is equal to
σi − 1. We allow for calibration to both the trade and tariff elasticity, since some
researchers have estimated tariff elasticities and others might have estimated trade
elasticities.
In the non-nested version of the model ρi = σi and in the nested version ρi < σi.
As discussed below, we work with the non-nested version of the model, but al-
low also for the nested version in the code, which is implemented for example in
Feenstra et al. (2018). Dixon et al. (2018) also incorporate the Melitz structure in
the existing nested preference structure of the GTAP model, but strictly impose
ρi = σi. In Akgul et al. (2016) imports are sourced directly to GTAP agents, which
corresponds also with a non-nested structure. Note that Francois (1998) also em-
ploys ρi = σi and ρi < σi versions of Ethier-Krugman monopolistic competition,
while Harrison et al. (1997) employ a nested version of Ethier-Krugman monopo-
listic competition.
The love of variety parameter νi governs the strength of love of variety. We
summarize the relation between the parameters appearing in the code and the pa-
rameters of the parameter file for calibration to the tariff elasticity in Table 2. The
table shows the values for ESUBM(i), ESUBD(i), NU(i), and THETA(i) implied by
the values set in the parameter file.
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Table 2. Parameterization of the four models
Name Meaning ARM ETK MEL
THETA θ Shape parameter Pareto distribution − − εv,ta − 1ξ
ESUBM σ Substitution elasticity between imports εv,ta εv,ta ξ ∗ εv,ta
ESUBD ρ Subst. elasticity imports/domestic εv,ta/υ εv,ta/υ ξ ∗ εv,ta/υ
NU ν Strength love-of-variety ν ν ν
Source: Authors own elaboration of parsimonious firm heterogeneity model.
3.6 Supply Shifter
The supply-side shifter in the Ethier-Krugman and Melitz model can be gath-
ered by log differentiating respectively equations (8) and (12)-(13):
ĉsoir = −
1
σi − 1
̂˜
qibir (23)
ĉmir = −
1
σi − 1
̂˜
qibir +
θi − σi + 1
(σi − 1)2
̂tpir pibir (24)
ĉdir = −
1
σi − 1
̂˜
qibir +
σi (θi − σi + 1)
(σi − 1)2
̂tpir pibir (25)
As mentioned in Appendix 3.3, the love-of-variety term in the Ethier-Krugman
model, Mis, can be modelled as part of the demand shifter and this is what we do.
Equations (23)-(25) correspond with the following equations for the domestic and
exporting marginal cost shifter, sshiftx(i,r) and sshiftd(i,r):
EQUATION O_SCALEMD (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
sshiftd(i,r) = [VARS(i)/(esubm(i)-1)] * nne(i,r) - zeta(i) * esubm(i)
* [pm(i,r) - num];
EQUATION O_SCALEMEX (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)}
sshiftx(i,r) = [VARS(i)/(esubm(i)-1)] * nne(i,r) - zeta(i) * [pm(i,r) - num];
nne (i, r) is the percentage change in the number of varieties produced (in Ethier-
Krugman) or the number of potential entrants (in Melitz) and equal to the change
in the number of input bundles (or nearly proportional with the number of input
bundles),
̂˜
qibir . As pointed out in Appendix 3.4, the expressions for the number
of varieties, Nir, in the Ethier-Krugman model and for the number of potential
entrants, NEir, in the Melitz model are identical.
Zeta(i) (or ζi) is a function of parameters and defined as ζi =
θi−σi+1
(σi−1)2
. So zeta(i)
is equal to 0 when GRAN is equal to 1 and GRAN can thus be used to switch be-
tween Melitz and Ethier-Krugman in the expression for the supply shifters, sshi f td
and sshi f tx. Moreover, the parameter VARS(i) is used as a coefficient on nne(i) en-
abling us to switch off variety scaling and thus reduce Ethier-Krugman/Melitz to
Armington.
We deflate the price change term pm (i, r) in the calculation of the Melitz-shifter
in equation by the numeraire, such that a change in the numeraire does not change
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the size of the shifter and is thus neutral to a shock in the numeraire. This is also
done at other places where price terms appear in the demand and marginal cost
shifters. The variable num is defined at the introduction of the module and set
equal to the default numeraire pfactwld. Hence, if a user changes the numeraire in
the cmf, it should be changed as well in the code.17
Hat differentiating equation (9) gives the following expression in GEMPACK-
code:
EQUATION O_SCALE (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)}
nne(i,r) = (VOM(i,r)/(VOM(i,r) - [esubm(i)/(esubm(i)-1)]
* SUM(t,reg, (VXMD(i,r,t)-VIWS(i,r,t))))) * qo(i,r)
- [esubm(i)/(esubm(i)-1)]
* SUM(s,reg, (VXMD(i,r,s)/(VOM(i,r)
- SUM(t,reg,(VXMD(i,r,t)-VIWS(i,r,t)))))
* (pcif(i,r,s)+qxs(i,r,s) - (VXWD(i,r,s)/VIWS(i,r,s))
* (pm(i,r) - num -tx(i,r) - txs(i,r,s))}
- ((VIWS(i,r,s)-VXWD(i,r,s))/VIWS(i,r,s))
* ptrans(i,r,s))) + [esubm(i)/(esubm(i)-1)]}
* SUM(s,reg, (VIWS(i,r,s)/(VOM(i,r)
- SUM(t,reg,(VXMD(i,r,t)-VIWS(i,r,t))))) }
* (pcif(i,r,s)+qxs(i,r,s)-(pm(i,r)- num)));
In the code we use an approximation of the above formula which generates
almost identical results as discussed below that solves faster and in a more stable
way:
EQUATION O_SCALE (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
nne(i,r) = qo(i,r);
The second formula does not deal exactly correct with the transport sector. The
first expression contains additional terms, reflecting the impact of the size of trans-
port services and export subsidies to all destination partners on the number of
varietes. In Appendix D we show that the difference between using the two ex-
pressions for nne are very small. In this appendix we furthermore show that im-
plementation of the Ethier-Krugman framework as in Francois (1998) also gen-
erates very similar results from counterfactual experiments. Francois (1998) also
writes the variety-scaling term nne (i, r) as a function of qo (i, r) (or qva (i, r) which
is equivalent to using qo (i, r) given the Leontief structure between intermediates
and value added in gross output). However, he includes the variety-scaling term
in the technology shifter, ao (i, r), so before transport costs are paid. In Appendix D
we conduct an experiment of variations in iceberg trade costs between all regions
from −25% to 25% for the aggregation also used in the simulations presented be-
low with three ways to model variety scaling: first, as in Francois (1998) including
variety scaling before transport costs are paid; second, including variety scaling af-
ter transport costs are paid but with the variety scaling term nne (i, r) proportional
to qo (i, r); and third, using the theoretically correct approach with variety scaling
17 Alternatively, the variable numeraire could be set equal to zero (as exogenous variable),
as long as no numeraire shock is implemented.
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after transport costs are paid and nne (i, r) a non-linear function of qo (i, r). We find
that changes in the world equivalent variation are virtually identical for the three
approaches and especially the second and third approach generate very similar re-
sults. This indicates that, at least to us, it is reasonable to work with nne (i, r) being
proportional to qo (i, r) instead of the non-linear specification.
3.7 Demand Shifter
To determine the demand shifters, we log differentiate the theoretical expression
for the shifter in equation (15):
êsois = (νi − 1)
(
1
σi − 1 + ζi
)
M̂is + ζi∑
ag
(
Pagis
taso,agis
)ρi−1 Eagis
taso,agis
∑
ag′
(
Pag
′
is
taso,ag
′
is
)ρi−1
Eag
′
is
taso,ag
′
is
∗
(
(ρi − 1)
(
P̂agis − ̂taso,agis )+ (σi − ρi) p̂sois + (Êagis − ̂taso,agis )) (26)
ζi is defined as before as ζi =
θi−σi+1
(σi−1)2
. Multiplying the numerator and denominator
of the coefficient by
(
pdj
edj
)1−ρ
and
(
pmj
)1−σ
for respectively domestic and imported
values, we can rewrite equation (26) as follows:
êsois = (νi − 1)
(
1
σi − 1 +
θi − σi + 1
(σi − 1)2
)
M̂is + ζi ∑
ag=
psois q
so,ag
is
∑
ag′
psois q
so,ag′
is
∗
(
(ρi − 1)
(
P̂agis − ̂taso,agis )+ (σi − ρi) p̂sois + (Êagis − ̂taso,agis )) (27)
To find the equivalent expression in GTAP notation, we observe that the coefficient
in the summation term is equal to the share of expenditures of group ag in expen-
ditures by all groups for source so = d, m. Equation (27) can thus be written in
GEMPACK notation as follows for so = d:
EQUATION D_SCALED (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)}
dshiftd(i,r) = (nu(i) - 1) * ((1/(esubm(i) - 1)) + zeta(i)) * mh(i,r)
- zeta(i) * esubd(i) * tariffDd(i,r)
+ zeta(i) * (esubd(i) - 1) * [priceDd(i,r) - num]
+ zeta(i) * (valueDd(i,r) - num)
+ zeta(i) * (esubm(i) - esubd(i)) * (pm(i,r) - sshiftd(i,r)
- dshiftd(i,r) - num);
For so = m we get:
EQUATION D_SCALEM (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)}
dshiftm(i,r) = (nu(i) - 1) * ((1/(esubm(i) - 1)) + zeta(i)) * mh(i,r)
- zeta(i) * esubd(i) * tariffDm(i,r)
+ zeta(i) * (esubd(i) - 1) * [priceDm(i,r) - num]
+ zeta(i) * (valueDm(i,r)-num)}
+ zeta(i) * (esubm(i) - esubd(i)) * (pim(i,r) - num);
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priceDm (i, r) is the price index term of the shifter in sector i in country r, while
valueDm (i, r) is the value term, and tari f f Dm (i, r) is the tariff term, defined re-
spectively as:
EQUATION PREGDEMANDm
# change in value of regional price for commodity i #
(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
priceDm(i,r) = SHRIPM(i,r) * pp(i,r) + SHRIGM(i,r) * pg(i,r)
+ sum(j,PROD_COMM, (SHRIFM(i,j,r) * pf(i,j,r)));
EQUATION VREGDEMANDm
# change in value of regional expenditure for commodity i #
(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
valueDm(i,r) = SHRIPM(i,r)*[pp(i,r) + qp(i,r)]
+ SHRIGM(i,r) * [pg(i,r) + qg(i,r)]
+ sum(j,PROD_COMM, (SHRIFM(i,j,r) * [pf(i,j,r) + qf(i,j,r)]));
EQUATION TREGDEMANDm
# change in value of regional tariff for commodity i #
(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
tariffDm(i,r) = SHRIPM(i,r) * tpm(i,r) + SHRIGM(i,r) * tgm(i,r)
+ sum(j,PROD_COMM, (SHRIFM(i,j,r) * tfm(i,j,r)));
The supply-shifter zeta (i) is equal to zero when GRAN(i) = 1, implying that
only the term in mh (i, r) remains as required in the Ethier-Krugman model. In
the domestic demand shifter, we have to subtract sshi f td (i, r) and dshi f td (i, r)
from the domestic price pm (i, r). The reason is that p̂dis in equation (27) is the price
inclusive of the supply and demand shifter (the price corresponding with quantity
qd,agis ), whereas pm (i, r) is the price without shifter (tpis p
ib
is in our theoretical model-
notation).
pp, pg, and p f are percentage price changes for respectively private households,
government and firms and qp, qg, and q f the quantity equivalents. SHRIPM (i, r)
is the share of import value spent on private goods and the terms SHRIGM (i, r)
and SHRIFM (i, j, r) are defined similarly for shares spent on government goods
and intermediates respectively. As with the marginal cost shifter, we deflate the
price and value changes (based on price changes) in the calculation of the shifter
by the numeraire.
The expression for mh(i,r), the percentage change in the total number of varieties
consumed, is derived and presented in Appendix B.
3.8 Trade Cost Shifter
The generalized iceberg trade costs (or trade cost shifter) are equal to the nor-
mal iceberg trade costs in the Armington and Ethier-Krugman model. Only in the
Melitz model the two are distinct and generalized iceberg trade costs are defined
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in equation (14). Hat differentiating this equation gives:
t̂irs =
θi − σi + 1
σi − 1 p̂
ci f
irs +
θi
σi − 1 τ̂irs
+
σi (θi − σi + 1)
(σi − 1)2
t̂airs +
θi − σi + 1
(σi − 1)2
f̂irs (28)
To convert equation (28) into the equivalent expression in the GTAP code, we in-
troduce two new variables, itc (i, r, s) and f ex (i, r, s), representing respectively ice-
berg and fixed trade costs. The corresponding expression for generalized iceberg
trade costs, genitc (i, r, s), in the code is given by:
EQUATION GENITCEQ (all,i,trad_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
genitc(i,r,s) = zeta(i)*esubm(i)*(tm(i,s)+tms(i,r,s))
+ [theta(i)/(esubm(i)-1)] * itc(i,r,s) + zeta(i) * fex(i,r,s)
+ zeta(i) * (esubm(i) - 1) * (pcif(i,r,s) - num);
GRAN(i)=1 implies zeta (i) = 0 as argued above. The coefficient on itc will
then be 1, whereas all other terms zero, as required in the Ethier-Krugman and
Melitz model. We observe that the variable ams (i, r, s) is a technology shifter for
international trade in the standard code, equal to minus the percentage change in
iceberg trade costs. We endogenize ams (i, r, s) and express it as follows:
EQUATION AMSEQ (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
ams(i,r,s)= - genitc(i,r,s);
Fixed trade costs and iceberg trade costs determine together generalized iceberg
trade costs in the Melitz version of the model. Since the computer code is written
in percentage changes, we do not need explicit values for baseline shifter param-
eters or trade costs. This also holds for both iceberg and fixed trade costs. As is
customary in CGE-models, baseline trade shares are equal to actual trade shares in
the data. The calibration of fixed trade costs is further discussed in Section 4.
3.9 Margin Decomposition of Trade
As discussed, in the Melitz model there are three margins, the intensive mar-
gin, the extensive margin, and the compositional margin; in the Ethier-Krugman
model only the first two margins are operative; and in the Armington mode only
the intensive margin is operative. We first present the margin decomposition in the
Melitz model and then go into the decomposition in the Ethier-Krugman model.
Total trade flows as measured in cif-terms, inclusive of bilateral import tariffs, but
exclusive of group-specific importer tariffs, virs, can be written as the number of
varieties, Nirs, times the average revenues exclusive of group-specific tariffs, r˜irs:
virs = Nirsr˜irs = Nirs
1
1− G (ϕ∗irs)
∞∫
ϕ∗irs
rirs (ϕ) g (ϕ) dϕ (29)
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Log differentiating equation (29) on the RHS and LHS wrt to the endogenous vari-
ables gives:
d ln Virs = d ln Nirs + Nirs
1
1− G (ϕ∗irs)
∞∫
ϕ∗irs
d ln rirs (ϕ)
rirs (ϕ)
rirs (ϕ˜)
g (ϕ) dϕ
+
∂ ln (1− G (ϕ∗irs))
∂ ln ϕ∗irs
d ln ϕ∗irs
(
rirs (ϕ∗irs)
rirs (ϕ˜irs)
− 1
)
(30)
The first term represents the extensive margin, EM, i.e. the change in the mass
of firms. The second term is the intensive margin, IM, so the change in sales of
already exporting firms, not changing the cutoff productivity yet. The third term is
the compositional margin, CM, expressing the change in export sales, because of a
change in the cutoff productivity and thus in the composition of firms exporting.
We can determine the extensive margin from the fact that in steady state the
number of firms exiting (the number of varieties, Nirs, times the death probability)
is equal to the number of potential entrants, NEir, times the probability of entry,
1− Gi (ϕ∗irs). Reorganized this gives:
Nirs =
(1− Gi (ϕ∗irs)) NEir
δ
=
(
κir
ϕ∗irs
)θi NEir
δ
(31)
The second equality sign follows from imposing the Pareto distribution (equation
(11)). Hat differentiating equation (31) we can write the extensive margin as fol-
lows:
EMirs = d ln Nirs = −θi ϕ̂∗irs + N̂Eir (32)
To express the compositional margin, CM, we recognize that the ratio of average
revenues and cutoff revenues is proportional to the ratio of cutoff productivities,
rirs(ϕ∗irs)
rirs(ϕ˜)
=
(
ϕ∗irs
ϕ˜irs
) 1
σ−1
. Under the Pareto distribution the average productivity is
proportional to the cutoff productivity, ϕ˜irs =
(
θi
θi−σi+1
) 1
σi−1 ϕ∗irs. Combining these
two facts, the compositional margin can be written as:
CMirs = −θi ϕ̂∗irs
(
θi − σi + 1
θi
− 1
)
= (σi − 1) ϕ̂∗irs (33)
Comparing the expressions for the extensive and compositional margin in equa-
tions (32) and (33), we see that the terms in ϕ∗irs in both expressions cancel out if the
firm size distribution moves to granularity (θi = σi − 1). Hence, only the number
of entrants part of the extensive margin would remain in place. This term is only
non-zero in a setting with multiple sectors and/or endogenous factor supply, such
that the number of input bundles per sector can change.
Finally, we can elaborate on the intensive margin, IM, using the expression for
revenues in Appendix A (equation (A.12)):
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IMirs =
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ϕ
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= (1− σi)
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τ̂irs + t̂airs + p̂
ci f
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)
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ag
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so,ag
is
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psois q
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is
∗
(
(νi − 1) M̂is + (ρi − 1) P̂agis + (ρi − σi) p̂sois + Êagis − ρi t̂aagis
)
(34)
Under Armington only the intensive margin is operative. Under Ethier-Krugman
both the extensive and the intensive margin are operative with the following straight-
forward decomposition:
d ln Virs = d ln Nir + d ln rirs (35)
To derive expressions for the three margins in the code, we need an expression
for the cutoff productivity, which is given by (derivation in Appendix A):
ϕ∗irs =
σi
σi−1 tairsτirs p
ci f
irs(
σi firstpir pibir tairs
) 1
1−σ
∑
ag
(
Pagis
taso,agis p
so
is
)ρi−1 Mνi−1is (psois )σi−1 Eagis
taso,agis
 11−σi (36)
Log differentiating equation (36) leads to:
ϕ̂∗irs =
1
σi − 1 p̂
ib
ir +
(
1+
1
σi − 1
)
t̂airs + τ̂irs + p̂
ci f
irs +
1
σi − 1 f̂irs −
1
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)
(37)
In GEMPACK notation equation (37) corresponds with the following expression:
EQUATION PSISTAREQ (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
psistar(i,r,s) = VARS(i) * (1 - ETK(i)) * {(1/(esubm(i) - 1)) * [pm(i,r)]
+ (1 + (1/(esubm(i) - 1))) * (tm(i,s) + tms(i,r,s))
+ (itc(i,r,s) + pcif(i,r,s)) + (1/(esubm(i)-1)) * fex(i,r,s)
- ((nu(i) - 1)/(esubm(i) - 1)) * mh(i,s)
- ((esubd(i) - 1)/(esubm(i) - 1)) * priceDm(i,s)
- (1/(esubm(i) - 1)) * valueDm(i,s)
+ (esubd(i)/(esubm(i) - 1)) * tariffDm(i,s)
- ((esubm(i) - esubd(i))/(esubm(i) - 1)) * pim(i,s)};
The three margins are expressed in values as (linear,change)-variables. In this
way the three margins add up to the total margin. The extensive margin can be
expressed as a function of the cutoff productivity, psistar, and the number of en-
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trants, nne, according to equation (32). We define the contribution of these two
terms separately and also account for the fact that the extensive margin is equal to
the change in the number of entrants only in the Ethier-Krugman model:
EQUATION EXTM1EQ (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
extmpsi(i,r,s) = 0.01 * VXMD(i,r,s) * VARS(i) * (1 - ETK(i))
* { - theta(i) * psistar(i,r,s)};
EQUATION EXTM2EQ (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
extmn(i,r,s) = 0.01 * VXMD(i,r,s) * VARS(i) * nne(i,r);
EQUATION EXTMPSIEQ (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
extmparts(i,r,s) = extmpsi(i,r,s) + extmn(i,r,s);
Next, the compositional margin is a function of the change in cutoff productiv-
ity:
EQUATION COMPMPSIEQ (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
compmparts(i,r,s) = 0.01 * VXMD(i,r,s) * (esubm(i) - 1) * psistar(i,r,s);
Finally, the intensive margin is defined in equation (34) for the Melitz model. For
the Ethier-Krugman model the intensive margin is equal to the total change in trade
exclusive of the supply shifter. This corresponds with the following expression in
the GEMPACK-code:
EQUATION INTMEQ (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
intm(i,r,s) = 0.01 * VXMD(i,r,s) * {VARS(i)*(1-ETK(i)) * { - (esubm(i) - 1)
* (tm(i,s) + tms(i,r,s) + itc(i,r,s) + pcif(i,r,s))
+ (nu(i) - 1) * mh(i,s) + (esubd(i) - 1) * priceDm(i,s)
+ valueDm(i,s) - esubd(i)*tariffDm(i,s)
+ (esubm(i)-esubd(i)) * pim(i,s)} + ((1 - VARS(i)) + ETK(i))
* {pms(i,r,s) - ams(i,r,s) + qim(i,s)
- ESUBM(i) * [pms(i,r,s) - ams(i,r,s) - pim(i,s)]
+ (nu(i) - 1) * mh(i,s)}};
For domestic sales we get somewhat different expressions, since there are no
export taxes, cif-fob margins, and import tariffs for domestic sales. We should keep
in mind that the international margins are also defined for trade flows within the
same region, representing international trade between countries within a region.
Although these values are formally also defined for entire countries, like the USA,
they do not have a meaning.
The change in the domestic cutoff productivity, psistard (i, s), is defined as:
EQUATION PSISTARDEQ (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,s,REG)
psistard(i,s) = VARS(i) * (1 - ETK(i)) * {(esubm(i)/(esubm(i) - 1)) * [pm(i,s)]
- ((nu(i)-1)/(esubm(i)-1)) * mh(i,s)
- ((esubd(i) - 1)/(esubm(i) - 1)) * priceDd(i,s)
- (1/(esubm(i) - 1)) * valueDd(i,s)
+ (esubd(i)/(esubm(i) - 1)) * tariffDd(i,s)
- ((esubm(i) - esubd(i))/(esubm(i) - 1))
* [pm(i,s) - sshiftd(i,s) - dshiftd(i,s)]};
The compositional and extensive margin are a function of psistard and nne as
above for the international margins. Only the expression for the intensive margin
changes:
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EQUATION INTMDEQ (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,s,REG)
intmd(i,s) = 0.01 * VXMD(i,r,s) * {VARS(i) * (1 - ETK(i))
* { - (esubd(i) - 1) * (pm(i,s))}
+ (nu(i)-1)*mh(i,s) + (esubd(i)-1) * priceDd(i,s)
+ valueDd(i,s) - esubd(i) * tariffDd(i,s)}
- VARS(i) * {(esubm(i) - esubd(i)) * (sshiftd(i,s) + dshiftd(i,s))}
{+ ((1 - VARS(i)) + ETK(i)) * {SHRDPM(i,s)
* {pm(i,s) + qp(i,s) - ESUBD(i) * [ppd(i,s) - pp(i,s)]}
+ sum(j,PROD_COMM, SHRDFM(i,j,s)
* {pm(i,s) + qf(i,j,s) - ESUBD(i) * [pfd(i,j,s) - pf(i,j,s)]})
+ SHRDGM(i,s) * {pm(i,s) + qg(i,s) - ESUBD(i)
* [pgd(i,s) - pg(i,s)]} + (nu(i) - 1) * mh(i,s)}};
As a check on the correctness of our expressions we compare the sum of the
three margins with the change in the value of trade, qxs(i,r,s) + pms(i,r,s) for inter-
national flows, and pm(i,s) + qds(i,s) for domestic flows. Finally, we decompose
the change in the value of sectoral sales, pm(i,r) + qo(i,r), into changes in domestic
sales, exporting sales, and sales to the transport sector. Domestic and exporting
sales can in turn be decomposed into the intensive, extensive, and compositional
margins. For example the contribution of the domestic intensive margin to the total
change in the value of sectoral sales is defined as follows with SHRDM the share
of domestic sales in total sectoral sales:
Equation decomp_intmd_eq
# Domestic intensive margin contribution to total sales #
(all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,s,REG)
decomp_intmd(i,s) = SHRDM(i,s) * intmd(i,s);
3.10 Welfare Decomposition
We extend the welfare decomposition of the standard GTAP model as devel-
oped by Huff and Hertel (2000) to account for the additional effects in the Ethier-
Krugman and Melitz model. We start by extending the decomposition mapped out
in Huff and Hertel (2000) to account for the two additional terms in our analysis,
the demand and supply shifters. Then we point out how these additional terms,
together with the trade cost shifter, can be expressed as a function of changes in
the mass of varieties, in the average productivity, and iceberg trade costs. This last
step shows that in the firm heterogeneity model welfare is affected in two addi-
tional ways, by a change in the number of varieties and a change in the average
productivity.
We start from the derivation of the EV decomposition in the multi-region model
in Appendix B of Huff and Hertel (2000). The presence of the demand and supply
shifters means that we have to make three changes in the steps taken to generate
their welfare decomposition. First, the expression for zero profits has to be ex-
tended to take into account the presence of the demand and supply shifters. The
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new zero profit condition becomes:
VOA (j, r) ∗ [ps (j, r) ∗ ao (j, r)]
= sum (i, ENDW COMM, VFA (i, j, r) ∗ [p f e (i, j, r)− a f e (i, j, r)− ava (j, r)])
+ sum (i, TRAD COMM, VIFA (i, j, r) ∗ [p f m (i, j, r)− a f (i, j, r)])
+ sum(i, TRAD COMM,
VDFA (i, j, r) ∗ [p f d (i, j, r)− dshi f td (i, r)− sshi f td (i, r)− a f (i, j, r)]) (38)
Second, in defining real income the impact of the demand and supply shifters on
pp and pg should be taken into account. Real income is in the derivations defined
as nominal income y minus weighted terms in psave, ppm, ppd, pgm, and pgd.
However, pp for example is a function of ppm and ppd minus dshi f td and sshi f td.
The last two terms thus have to be added on the RHS of the expression of real
welfare.
Third, we should take into account that pim is a function of pms and moreover
of dshi f tm, sshi f tx and ams, implying that we have the following:
sum {i, sum (s, VIMS (i, s, r) ∗ pms (i, s, r))} − sum {i, VIM (i, r) ∗ pim (i, r)} =
sum{i, sum{s, VIMS (i, s, r) [ams (i, s, r) + sshi f tx (i, s) + dshi f tm (i, r)]}} (39)
Hence, the terms on the second line of equation (39) become part of the welfare
decomposition when the two terms on the first line are consolidated.
Taking into account the above three changes means that we have to add the
contribution to EV of the demand shifter, CNTdemr, and of the supply (or variety
scaling) shifter, CNTvarr:
Equation CONT_EV_demr (all,r,REG)
CNTdemr(r) = [0.01 * EVSCALFACT(r)]
* {sum(i,TRAD_COMM,sum(s,REG,VIMS(i,s,r)) * dshiftm(i,r))
+ sum(i,TRAD_COMM,[{VDPA(i,r) + VDGA(i,r)
+ sum(j,PROD_COMM,VDFA(i,j,r))} * dshiftd(i,r)])};
Equation CONT_EV_varr (all,r,REG)
CNTvarr(r) = [0.01 * EVSCALFACT(r)]
* {sum(i,TRAD_COMM, sum(s,REG, VIMS(i,s,r) * sshiftx(i,s)))
+ sum(i,TRAD_COMM,[{VDPA(i,r) + VDGA(i,r)
+ sum(j,PROD_COMM,VDFA(i,j,r))} * sshiftd(i,r)])};
Adding these additional terms to the expression for the alternative equivalent
variation, EVALT, we find that EVALT is equal to EV.
As a next step we can rewrite the additional demand shifter and supply shifter
terms together with generalized iceberg trade costs as a function of the number of
varieties Nirs, average productivity ϕ˜irs and the love of variety term Mis. We write
the bilateral price inclusive of all shifters as follows:
tairstirscmir p
ci f
irs ta
s,ag
is
emis
=
σi
σi − 1
(
Mνi−1is Nirs
(
tairsta
so,ag
is τirs p
ci f
irs
)1−σi
ϕ˜σi−1irs
) 1
1−σi
(40)
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Hence, we can write the additional terms in cir, emis , and tirs as follows:
tirscmir
emis
=
σi
σi − 1 M
νi−1
1−σi
is
N
1
1−σi
irs
ϕ˜irs
τirs (41)
Hat differentiating equation (41) gives in GEMPACK notation the following:
ams (i, r, s)− sshi f tx (i, r)− dshi f tm (i, s)
=
ν− 1
1− σmh (i, s)−
1
1− σnvi (i, r, s)− psistar (i, r, s) + itc (i, r, s) (42)
Therefore, we can replace the two terms introduced above, CNTdemr and CNTvarr,
by CNT M, CNT nvi, CNT nvd, CNT psii, CNT psid, and CNT tc, representing
the contribution to the change in welfare of respectively changes in the love of va-
riety term, changes in imported and domestic varieties, changes in importer and
domestic average productivity, and changes in iceberg trade costs. These terms are
defined as follows (CNT nvd, and CNT psid are omitted as they are similar):
Equation CONT_EV_M (all,r,REG)
CNT_M(r) = [0.01 * EVSCALFACT(r)]
* {sum(i,TRAD_COMM,{[{VDPA(i,r)+VDGA(i,r)
+ sum(j,PROD_COMM,VDFA(i,j,r))}
+ sum(s,REG,VIMS(i,s,r))]
* ((nu(i) - 1)/(ESUBM(i) - 1)) * mh(i,r)})};
Equation CONT_EV_nvi (all,r,REG)
CNT_nvi(r) = [0.01 * EVSCALFACT(r)]
* sum(i,TRAD_COMM,sum(s,REG,VIMS(i,s,r)
* (1/(ESUBM(i) - 1)) * NV(i,s,r)));
Equation CONT_EV_psii (all,r,REG)
CNT_psii(r) = [0.01 * EVSCALFACT(r)]
* sum(i,TRAD_COMM,sum(s,REG,VIMS(i,s,r) * psistar(i,s,r)));
Equation CONT_EV_tc (all,r,REG)
CNT_tc(r) = - [0.01 * EVSCALFACT(r)]
* sum(i,TRAD_COMM,sum(s,REG,VIMS(i,s,r) * itc(i,s,r)));
An alternative welfare decomposition can now be defined as
Equation EV_DECOMP_partsw}
# decomposition of Equivalent Variation from parts with N and psi #
(all,r,REG)
EV_ALT_partsw(r) = CNTdpar(r) + CNTalleffr(r) + CNTendwr(r) + CNTtotr(r)
+ CNTtechr_pure(r) + CNTcgdsr(r) + CNT_tc(r)
+ CNT_psii(r) + CNT_psid(r)
+ CNT_nvi(r) + CNT_nvd(r) + CNT_M(r);
4. Calibration
Table 1 shows that we need values for four new parameters in the model, the
tariff elasticity, εv,tai , the degree of granularity, ξi, the degree of nested preferences,
υ, and the strength of love of variety, ν. The latter variable is set equal to 1, thus
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imposing standard CES preferences. The degree of granularity is taken from the
literature. We work with a degree of granularity of 5/6 in all sectors, thus setting
it in between the value of 2/3 employed by Caliendo et al. (2015) and full granu-
larity.18 Akgul et al. (2015), Akgul and Ahmad (2017) and di Giovanni et al. (2011)
report substantial heterogeneity across sectors in the degree of firm size granular-
ity. Following Caliendo et al. (2015), we have decided to stick to a uniform value
for the degree of granularity. The estimates reported in di Giovanni et al. (2011)
for a cross-section of sectors based on French firm level data suggest that in many
sectors the degree of granularity ξi is larger than 1, which implies that the Melitz
model cannot be solved since average firm level sales would tend to infinity. Equiv-
alently, Akgul and Ahmad (2017) find that the degree of granularity in the motor
vehicles sector with American data is larger than 1. Given this lack of conclusive
evidence on the degree of granularity at the sector level in the Melitz-model with
Pareto productivity distribution, we decided to work with a uniform value for the
degree of granularity across sectors.
The degree of nested preferences, σi/ρi, is set equal to 1, as motivated below.
We could also calibrate to the trade elasticity, εv,τi , instead of the tariff elasticity.
Since most estimates at the sectoral level on trade responsiveness to costs seems
to focus on the tariff elasticity (Aichele et al. (2014), Egger et al. (2015), Caliendo
and Parro (2015), and Spearot (2016) for example estimate tariff elasticities at the
sectoral or product level), we concentrate here on calibration to the tariff elasticity,
also discussing the possibility of calibration to the trade elasticity.
Before going into estimation of the tariff elasticity and calculation of the ad val-
orem equivalent of trade policy measures based on gravity estimation, we address
two other points related to calibration. First, we observe that we do not need ex-
plicit values for the size of fixed costs. Iceberg trade costs together with fixed costs
are assumed implicitly to be such that the baseline import shares are equal to actual
import shares. So, the size of fixed trade costs does not matter in the model. Dixon
et al. (2018) follow a similar approach without explicit calibration of fixed costs
and discuss in their Chapter 4 how this approach compares with the approach in
Balistreri et al. (2012) where fixed costs are explicitly estimated. In our model gen-
eralized iceberg trade costs are a multiplicative function of iceberg and fixed trade
costs. Henceforth, the relative importance of the two types of trade costs does not
matter for calibration of the baseline.19 As discussed in the simulation results, in
case of shocks to trade costs, it matters whether shocks are imposed on iceberg or
on fixed trade costs, in particular in the decomposition of the effects on trade into
the intensive, extensive, and compositional margin. We want to stress that it is of-
18 Caliendo et al. (2015) cite Eaton et al. (2011) who find a value of θi/ (σi − 1) of 1.5, which
corresponds with a degree of granularity in our definition of 2/3.
19 In other models the distinction between iceberg and fixed trade costs matters. In Akgul
et al. (2016) for example input bundles employed in marginal and fixed costs are different
and henceforth the size of fixed costs in the baseline matters.
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tentimes difficult to identify whether trade policy measures, which will be of most
interest in counterfactual experiments, affect iceberg trade costs, fixed trade costs,
or both.
Second, a general characteristic of models combining love of variety with in-
creasing returns to scale is the emergence of corner solutions and infinitely large
effects, which makes the solution of counterfactual experiments oftentimes a dif-
ficult exercise. Three approaches have been identified in the literature to confront
this problem. First, scholars propose the use of nested preferences. As discussed
in Caliendo et al. (2015) working with nested preferences helps to prevent corner
solutions. Second, production factors can be assumed to be imperfectly mobile,
an approach used in Francois (1998). Third, as discussed in Balistreri et al. (2012)
and Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014) the share of intermediate inputs in gross
output sourced from a specific sector k in a using sector i can be smoothened by
setting it equal to the country-average share of intermediates from sector k times
the share of intermediate inputs in gross output in sector i. Hence, the share of
intermediates sourced from different sectors in total intermediates demand of a us-
ing sector is not specific to the using sector, but is the same across all using sectors.
For example, the intermediate share of metals in gross output of motor vehicles
would be equal to the average share of metals in total intermediates demand (by
all sectors) times the share of intermediates in gross output in motorvehicles. Britz
and Jafari (2017) follow a similar approach to prevent infinitely large effects lead-
ing to corner solutions, focusing in particular on the share of intermediates sourced
domestically.
We limit ourselves to the second approach. Adjusting the data to retain numeri-
cal tractability seems a bigger step than adopting nested preferences and imperfect
factor mobility. We decided to abstract from nested preferences. Caliendo et al.
(2015) set σi 1.25 times larger than ρi to avoid corner solutions. In the context of mo-
nopolistic competition nested preferences would imply that competition between
varieties from different countries is indirect. Feenstra et al. (2018) show that there
is no evidence for significant differences between σi and ρi in 3/4 of the manufac-
turing sectors. Our code is, however, general and allows for nesting of preferences,
which enables researchers to avoid corner solutions with more detailed aggrega-
tions.
As discussed in for example Francois (2001) and Francois and Nelson (2002)
models of monopolistic competition with perfect factor mobility are highly likely
to run into corner solutions. Therefore, we impose imperfect labor mobility. Empir-
ical literature finds strong support for the presence of labor adjustment costs. Cruz
et al. (2017) estimate average labor adjustment costs equal to 1.4 times the annual
wage in 235 country times year surveys. Other studies like Artuc et al. (2015) and
Dix-Carneiro (2014) find even larger adjustment costs.
We set the elasticity of transformation of the three types of labor between sec-
tors at 5. This level prevents corner solutions and at the same time guarantees that
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aggregate affects are not affected very much. Francois (2001) shows that the ag-
gregate welfare effects (in Francois (2001) changes in real GDP) hardly vary with
the degree of factor mobility, whereas sectoral variation, as expected, does. Since
we are mainly interested in aggregate effects, our assumptions on imperfect labor
mobility are harmless. Scholars interested in sectoral effects could reduce the de-
gree of factor mobility, but should be careful in interpreting results with extreme
effects where certain sectors expand a lot in a country and others almost disappear.
Multi-sector increasing returns to scale models contain multiple equilibria, so one
cannot be very confident that the sectoral output effects found are unique.
4.1 Tariff Elasticities, Trade Elasticities, and AVEs
We can write the value of trade (net of bilateral tariffs), virs = 1tairs pirsqirs, in the
Armington and Ethier-Krugman model on the one hand and in the Melitz model
on the other hand, focusing on the differences in the bilateral term. Substituting
the expressions for tirs in Armington/Ethier-Krugman, tirs = τirs, and in Melitz, tirs
as defined in equation (14), into the expression for demand in (3) gives:
varm,etkirs = (τirsteirs (1+ itmirs))
1−σi ta−σiirs
(
emis p
m
is
tpir pibir c
m
ir
)σi−1
Emis (43)
vmelirs = (τirsteirs (1+ itmirs))
−θi ta
−
(
θi+1+
θi−σi+1
(σi−1)
)
irs f
− θi−σi+1σi−1
irs
∗
(
emis p
m
is
tpir pibir c
m
ir
)σi−1
Emis (44)
The expression pci firs = teirstpir p
ib
ir (1+ itmirs) defines the cif-price, with teirs the ex-
port tax and itmirs the international transport margin, itmirs =
ptsijr
tpir pibir a
ts
ijr
. The co-
efficient on tariffs features an additional term in the Melitz model. This follows
from the assumption that tariffs are paid on the marked-up prices (called revenue-
shifting tariffs in for example Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014) and Caliendo
et al. (2015)). Therefore, the zero cutoff profit condition is affected differently by
tariffs than by the iceberg trade costs and the export taxes, implying a different
coefficient on the gravity equation. Further discussion is in Bekkers and Francois
(2018).
The empirical gravity equation can be written as follows:20
vempirs = exp{−εv,tai ln tairs − εv,tei (teirs (1+ itmirs)) + atcci ln tccirs + atcdi tcdirs
+ψir + ηis + ε irs} (45)
20 We include a minus sign before the tariff and trade elasticities, εv,tai and ε
v,τ
i respectively,
implying that these elasticities are positive.
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Exporter and importer fixed effects, ψir and ηis, capture the exporter and im-
porter specific terms, respectively
(
tpir pibir c
m
ir
)1−σi and (emis pmis)σi−1 Emis . Comparing
equations (43)-(45) shows that the tariff elasticity, εv,tai , (based on the value of trade
net of import tariffs) is equal to σi in the Ethier-Krugman/Armington model and
equal to
(
θi + 1+
θi−σi+1
σi−1
)
in the Melitz model. Equations (43)-(45) show as well
that the trade elasticity, the elasticity of vempirs with respect to iceberg trade costs,
τirs, is θi in the Melitz model and σi − 1 in the Armington and Ethier-Krugman
models. In principle the tariff elasticities could be estimated structurally, as for ex-
ample in Egger et al. (2015) or Caliendo and Parro (2015). However, in this paper
we use the estimates in the GTAP database, assuming that the substitution elastic-
ities, ESUBM (i), are based on estimated tariff elasticities. If the GTAP elasticities
are used, the tariff elasticity, εv,tai , should be set equal to the substitution elasticities
between varieties from different countries, ESUBM (i).21
We include continuous measures of bilateral trade costs like distance and NTMs
denoted by tccirs (trade costs continuous), and dummy measures of bilateral trade
costs like contiguity, common language, common religion and membership of an
FTA denoted by the vector tcdirs (trade costs dummy) in the gravity equation. Turn-
ing to counterfactual experiments these measures can be mapped into their ad val-
orem equivalent (AVE) to determine the effects of a change in these measures. The
AVE of a measure is defined as the equivalent ad valorem trade cost of a 1% change
of the measure or in case of a dummy variable of a change of the measure from 0
to 1:
AVEtcc =
d ln τirs
d ln tccirs
(46)
AVEtcd =
τirs |tcdirs = 1 − τirs |tcdirs = 0
τirs |tcdirs = 0 (47)
The most common approach in the literature to determine the AVE is through the
estimation of a gravity equation. We show now how equations (43)-(45) can be
combined to express the AVE of a continuous variable as a function of the estimated
21 Also other empirically estimable elasticities could be used. It is important, however,
that the model is calibrated to the empirically estimated elasticities. So, if for example the
estimated tariff elasticities from Spearot (2016) are used, which give the shape parameters
θi in the Melitz-Ottaviano model, then these estimates should not be used as measures for
the shape parameters θi in the Melitz model. They should be used to identify the tariff
elasticities instead as well and from this the shape parameters in the Melitz model can be
identified in turn.
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gravity coefficients (using d ln virsd ln tccirs =
d ln virs
d ln τirs
d ln τirs
d ln tccirs
):22
AVEtccarm,etk =
atcci
1− σi = −
atcci
εv,τi
= − a
tcc
i
εv,tai − 1
(48)
AVEtccmel =
atcci
−θi = −
atcci
εv,τi
= − a
tcc
i
εv,tai − 1/ξi
(49)
For a dummy variable we get (using for example for the Melitz model virs|tcdirs=1virs|tcdirs=0 =(
τirs|tcdirs=1
τirs|tcdirs=0
)−θi
= exp (atcdtcdirs)):
AVEtcdarm,etk = exp
(
atcdi
1− σi
)
− 1 = exp
(
− a
tcd
i
εv,τi
)
= exp
(
− a
tcd
i
εv,tai − 1
)
− 1 (50)
AVEtcdmel = exp
(
atcdi
−θi
)
− 1 = exp
(
− a
tcd
i
εv,τi
)
= exp
(
− a
tcd
i
εv,tai − 1/ξi
)
− 1 (51)
So to calculate the AVE in the Melitz model based on the tariff elasticity an esti-
mate of the degree of granularity ξi is required. We have included the AVE based
on both the estimated tariff and trade elasticities , respectively εv,tai and ε
v,τ
i . In the
Armington and Ethier-Krugman models the tariff elasticity (based on cif prices net
of tariffs) is equal to the trade elasticity plus one, but in the Melitz model the tariff
elasticity features an additional term. Therefore, the AVE calculated from the same
estimated coefficient on a trade measure, atcdi , is identical in the Armington/Ethier-
Krugman models and the Melitz model when the trade elasticity is used to convert
the trade measure into the AVE. But the AVE is different when the tariff elasticity
is used to convert the trade measure.
In the Melitz model we have to take into account that a trade cost measure can
affect trade flows both through iceberg and through fixed trade costs. We can de-
fine the fixed cost equivalents (FCEs) of trade cost measures as follows:
FCEtccmel =
−atcci
− θi−σi+1σi−1
=
atcci
1
ξi
− 1 (52)
FCEtcdmel = exp
(
atcdi
1
ξi
− 1
)
− 1 (53)
Equation (52) indicates that FCEtccmel would go to infinity when the firm size distri-
bution tends to granularity (with ξi = 1). The reason is that fixed exporting costs
should not have any effect on trade flows under granularity (with the destination-
specific extensive margin and the compositional margin cancelled out against each
22 The alternative approach to determine AVEs is the price approach, attributing price dif-
ferences to the presence of AVEs (see for example Cadot and Gourdon (2016))
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other) thus implying that the effect of fixed trade costs should be zero.
The trade cost shifter, tirs from equation (14) is proportional with
(
τθij f
θ−σ+1
σ−1
ij
) 1
σ−1
.
Therefore, the elasticity of tirs with respect to the trade cost measure tccirs is equal to
atcci
σi−1 both when tccirs affects iceberg trade costs and when it affects fixed trade costs.
So for the total effect of a change in the trade cost measure tccirs in a counterfactual
experiment it does not matter whether it affects iceberg or fixed trade costs. Only
for the margin decomposition it does matter how the change is operationalized. In
general though it will be hard to determine conceptually whether observable trade
cost measures affect trade flows through iceberg or through fixed trade costs. For
example, it is likely that distance or the presence of a free trade agreement (FTA)
affects trade flows through both. It is less costly to start exporting in a country
at a shorter distance or in an FTA-partner. It is hard to find measures that only
affect one of the two trade costs. Our framework shows, however, that only for the
decomposition of the different trade margins it is necessary to identify the type of
trade costs affected (fixed or iceberg) by a generic trade cost measure.
5. Counterfactual Experiments
We conduct experiments with reductions in iceberg and fixed trade costs to illus-
trate our model. We do this in a setting with 11 countries, 11 sectors, and 6 factors
of production based on the GTAP10 data for 2014. An overview of the aggregation
can be found in Table E2. The parameters are as discussed in the previous section.
We set the values for the tariff elasticity, εv,tai , and trade elasticity, ε
v,τ
i , equal to re-
spectively ESUBM(i) and ESUBM(i)-1, thus using the parameter values implied by
the standard GTAP model with Armington preferences. We do this for the three
different models. We conduct three sets of trade cost experiments. First, we start
with a plain identical percentage change in iceberg trade costs in all sectors equal to
2%, thus abstracting from possible reasons for different sizes of shocks in the differ-
ent models. For comparison, we also implement a shock to fixed trade costs in the
Melitz model. To get a seemingly comparable shock in size to the 2% shock to ice-
berg trade costs, we reduce fixed trade costs by 56.9%. This number is based on the
fact that the elasticity of generalized trade costs with respect to iceberg trade costs
and fixed trade costs are respectively θiσi−1 and
θi−σi+1
(σi−1)2
. Based on a trade weighted
average tariff elasticity of 7 and a degree of granularity of 0.83, we get that a fixed
trade cost reduction of 56.9% is expected to be roughly equivalent to an iceberg
trade cost shock of 2%.23
Second, we implement a reduction in iceberg trade costs corresponding with a
coefficient of −0.1 for atcdi and the tariff elasticity, εv,tai , to transfer atcdi into the cor-
responding AVE and iceberg trade costs shock based on equations (50)-(51). We
23 56.9% = f̂ = θ(σ−1)θ−σ+1 τ̂ =
ξεv,ta−1
1−ξ τ̂ =
0.83∗7.03−1
1−0.83 ∗ 2%
38
Journal of Global Economic Analysis, Volume 3 (2018), No. 2, pp. 1-68.
also implement this shock through a reduction in fixed trade costs in the Melitz
model employing equations (53). atcdi = −0.1 could be for example the coeffi-
cient on a dummy variable for the presence of an FTA between countries. Since
the elasticities vary across sectors, shocks also vary across sectors. Furthermore,
the size of the shock differs between the Melitz model on the one hand and the
Armington/Ethier-Krugman models on the other hand. The reason is that the de-
nominators in calculating the AVEs in equations (50)-(51) differ between the mod-
els. The denominator is smaller in the Melitz model for the same tariff elastic-
ity, thus implying larger trade cost shocks. Given that the gravity equations are
observationally equivalent for the different models, we should employ the same
tariff elasticity. The tariff elasticity in the Melitz model contains an additional
positive term relative to the trade elasticity, whereas this is not the case in the
Armington/Ethier-Krugman models. Therefore, transforming a trade cost mea-
sure which is part of iceberg trade costs leads to a larger AVE in the Melitz model
than in the other models.
Dixon et al. (2016) also implement different shocks in the Melitz and Armington
model to make the models comparable (besides working with different substitution
elasticities). Their reason is different, however. They argue that the tariff bases
are different in the two models, with tariffs operating only on variable costs in
the Melitz model and not on fixed costs, whereas they operate on all costs in the
Armington model. Therefore, the tariff shock in the Armington model must be
lower in their representation of the different models. In later work, Dixon et al.
(2018), the tariff shock operates on cif prices in both models, so the adjustment in
the tariff shock to make the two models comparable is not needed anymore.
We argue that the starting point should be the empirically estimated tariff elas-
ticities and the estimated coefficients on trade policy measures, which are to be
changed in a counterfactual exercise. The estimated tariff elasticities and policy
measure coefficients should be identical across models. Subsequently the structure
of the different models should be employed to calculate the shocks to trade costs
and the behavioral parameters, the substitution elasticity, σi, and the shape param-
eter of the Pareto distribution, θi. Since the trade structure of the two models is
different, trade volume responses can then also be different.
As a third set of experiments, we use the same coefficient atcdi = −0.1, but em-
ploy the trade elasticity, εv,τi , to calculate the corresponding AVE. In this case the
size of the shocks is identical in the different models.
Table 3 displays the changes in the total equivalent variation in all countries
(wev) for the three sets of experiments and the three models. Three conclusions can
be drawn from the table. First, the different trade structures can be ranked in terms
of the size of welfare effects as in previous work: the largest welfare gains occur in
the Melitz model, followed by the Ethier-Krugman and Armington model. The dif-
ferences are relatively modest. The welfare gains in the Melitz model are about 10%
larger than in the Armington model, but the differences with the Ethier-Krugman
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Table 3. Changes in world equivalent variation (WEV) in millions of dollars in different
models and for different shocks
Experiment Calibration parameter Model Shock variable Size shock Change WEV
1 Tariff elasticity εv,tai Armington τirs −2% 550175
Ethier-Krugman τirs −2% 581626
Melitz τirs −2% 589167
Melitz firs −56.9% 1007820
2 Tariff elasticity εv,tai Armington a
tcd
i −0.1 524617
Ethier-Krugman atcdi −0.1 541857
Melitz atcdi (through τirs) −0.1 571887
Melitz atcdi (through firs) −0.1 571887
3 Trade elasticity εv,τi Armington a
tcd
i −0.1 524617
Ethier-Krugman atcdi −0.1 541857
Melitz atcdi (through τirs) −0.1 545907
Melitz atcdi (through firs) −0.1 545907
Notes: In experiments 1 and 2 the model is calibrated to the tariff elasticity and in experiment 3 to
the trade elasticity. Experiment 1 contains uniform shocks to iceberg and fixed trade costs, whereas
experiments 2 and 3 contain uniform shocks in the estimated trade cost dummy, tcdi, from zero to
one with different implied shocks to iceberg and fixed trade costs, depending on respectively tariff
and trade elasticities in experiments 2 and 3. The implied changes in iceberg trade costs in different
models are calculated as explained in the text, based on equations (50), (51), and (53).
Source: Authors calculations with parsimonious firm heterogeneity model.
model are more modest, in the range of 1%-2%. The differences are much smaller
than in some of the previous literature. However, the experiments conducted do
not include features which are likely to drive the large effects in the Melitz model,
endogenous factor supply and different bundles in fixed and variable costs in re-
spectively Balistreri et al. (2010) and Akgul et al. (2016).
Second, Table 3 shows that the way equality of shocks is operationalized has
some impact on the welfare effects. In particular, the difference between the Melitz
welfare effects and the Ethier-Krugman welfare effects are largest when identical
shocks to trade cost measures are converted into ad valorem equivalents based on
the model calibrated using tariff elasticities.
Third, as expected, the total effects are identical for shocks to fixed export costs
and shocks to iceberg trade costs for the second and third experiment. But we see
that the rough conversion of the iceberg trade cost reduction into the reduction
in fixed export costs in the first experiment, based on the trade-weighted average
tariff elasticity and degree of granularity was not very successful. A shock to fixed
export costs of 56.9% has a much lager impact than the 2% shock to iceberg trade
costs. The reason for the larger effect in case of the shock to fixed trade costs is
that the conversion from iceberg to fixed trade cost shocks based on a single trade-
weighted average tariff elasticity leads to different shocks to generalized iceberg
trade costs, genitc. Shocks to sectors with a small trade elasticity become bigger
and shocks to sectors with a large elasticity become smaller. It turns out that this
leads to larger welfare effects.
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Next, we turn to the decomposition of the welfare effects for the first set of ex-
periments with identical reductions in iceberg and fixed trade costs in the three
models in Table 4.24 We see that the direct impact of reductions in iceberg trade
costs (the term ”pure iceberg trade costs”) is very similar across the three mod-
els. The additional welfare gains under Ethier-Krugman and Melitz are partially
driven by larger allocative efficiency effects, but mostly by the additional terms
importer and domestic productivity and importer and domestic variety. We see
that in the Melitz model the increase in domestic productivity is somewhat larger
than the fall in importer productivity. Domestic productivity rises, because the
least-productive firms are squeezed out of the market, whereas the productivity of
importers into the country evaluated falls, as it becomes less costly to import into
foreign markets.25 The same holds for changes in the number of varieties. The pos-
itive contribution to welfare of an increase in the number of imported varieties is
somewhat larger than the negative contribution of the fall in the number of domes-
tic varieties. In the Ethier-Krugman model we see that changes in both the number
of domestic and imported varieties are positive. The reason for this difference with
the Melitz model is that in the Melitz model the share of firms involved in inter-
national trade changes. In the Ethier-Krugman model instead the number of firms
from a certain country is identical for all destination markets by the absence of
destination-specific fixed costs.
This decomposition provides important insights into the workings of the dif-
ferent models. In the Armington model only the conventional welfare effects are
present. In the Ethier-Krugman model also changes in the number of varieties start
to play a role. In particular, reductions in iceberg trade costs lead to an increase in
welfare for the world as a whole (”Total”), because of an increase in the number
of both domestic and imported varieties. However, the contribution of changes
in the number of varieties to welfare is not positive for all regions. Table 4 shows
for example that the contribution to welfare of changes in the number of domestic
varieties is negative, whereas changes in the number of imported varieties is pos-
itive. The reason for these opposite signs is that resources are reallocated across
sectors. A net reallocation of resources to sectors with weak love-of-variety effects
(high substitution elasticities) will reduce welfare, whereas a reallocation towards
sectors with strong love-of-variety will raise welfare. Dixon et al. (2018) and Fran-
cois et al. (2005) also stress the impact of intersectoral reallocation towards sectors
with scale and love-of-variety effects, although Dixon et al. do so in simulations
in which only one sector features monopolistic competition and the other sectors
remaining Armington.
24 To save space we only present the global results ( ”Total ”) and for two regions, East Asia
and the European Union. Results for the other regions are in the appendix.
25 We use the term importer productivity, because this term measures the impact of changes
in productivity of all countries importing into the country for which the welfare change is
measured.
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In the Melitz model both changes in productivity and in the number of vari-
eties play a role. With a fall in iceberg trade costs it becomes easier to export and
therefore more firms will export. In terms of the impact on welfare this will on the
one hand raise welfare through an increase in the number of varieties imported, the
term ”importer variety.” On the other hand this will imply that also less productive
firms can start to export and therefore we see a negative contribution to welfare of
the term ”importer productivity.” The average productivity level of firms export-
ing to a given importer will fall with trade liberalization. However, also in the
domestic market we will see changes. As first shown theoretically by Melitz (2003)
a so-called composition effect will occur. As a result of intensified competition the
real wage will rise (or in the present context real bundle prices rise) and some of
the least productive firms will be squeezed out of the market. This affects welfare
in two ways. On the one hand welfare is increasing through a rise in domestic pro-
ductivity. On the other hand, the number of domestic varieties supplied will also
fall.
Comparing the four additional terms in Table 4 shows that for the world as
a whole (”Total”) the positive domestic productivity effects tend to dominate the
negative domestic variety effect and the positive importer variety effect tends to
dominate the negative importer productivity effect. As a result, the additional
mechanisms in the Melitz model raise the total welfare effects of global reduc-
tions in trade costs in comparison with the Ethier-Krugman and Armington mod-
els. Akgul et al. (2016) find similar results, although the differences in welfare
effects in their model are much bigger. This is due to the fact that their model fea-
tures an important additional mechanism in the firm heterogeneity model. In their
model fixed costs employ only value added input bundles, whereas marginal costs
employ a combination of value added and intermediate input bundles. Trade liber-
alization will reduce the costs of intermediate input bundles and thus of marginal
costs relative to fixed costs. As a result average firm size can increase, generating a
positive scale effect.
The decomposition for the shock to fixed costs deserves additional explanation.
The pure iceberg trade costs term is zero, as obviously there is no shock to iceberg
trade costs. However, we also did not include a separate term for the change in
fixed trade costs. The reason is that the effects of changes in fixed trade costs all
run through changes in the number of varieties and productivity. We observe that
the negative contribution of the change in importer productivity is an order of mag-
nitude larger than the positive contribution of the change in domestic productivity.
At the same time the positive contribution of the change in imported varieties is an
order of magnitude larger than the negative contribution of the change in the num-
ber of domestic varieties. A reduction in fixed trade costs provokes a huge increase
in the number of imported varieties in the model, which harms welfare through
the reduction in average productivity of exporting firms (a compositional margin
effect) and raises welfare through the increase in the number of imported varieties
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available. Reductions in fixed costs mainly lead to an increase in the number of
small firms able to export. On net the contribution of the increase in the number of
firms exporting is positive.
Table 5. Changes in the value of trade in millions of dollars along the different trade
margins
Shock variable Model Regions Margins
Intensive Extensive Compositional Total
Total 34058 0 0 34058
Iceberg trade costs Armington East Asia 15165 0 0 15165
EU 9684 0 0 9684
Total 42080 5589 0 47668
Iceberg trade costs Ethier-Krugman East Asia 16320 -29 0 16291
EU 11492 -1302 0 10190
Total 31742 59277 -41542 49477
Iceberg trade costs Melitz East Asia 12764 17408 -14395 15777
EU 8637 11376 -10489 9523
Total -86636 898728 -724526 87568
Fixed trade costs Melitz East Asia -13596 197346 -162817 20934
EU -22090 241575 -202180 17306
Notes: Changes in the value of trade are decomposed for experiment 1 with uniform reductions in
iceberg and fixed trade costs
Source: Authors calculations with parsimonious firm heterogeneity model.
Table 5 decomposes the change in the value of trade into the three margins in-
troduced before, the intensive, extensive, and compositional margin. Three things
stand out from the table. First, the total change in the world value of trade for
an identical shock to iceberg trade costs of 2% is largest in the Melitz model, fol-
lowed by the Ethier-Krugman model, and then the Armington model.26 We do
not take into account the changes in the Melitz model provoked by shocks to fixed
costs, since the total welfare effects are also much larger for this shock due to the
size of the shock. Second, the intensive margin is smallest in the Melitz model,
which is compensated for by a large value of the extensive margin relative to the
compositional margin. Third, we see that the contribution of the extensive margin
in the Ethier-Krugman model is an order of magnitude smaller than in the Melitz
model. In the Ethier-Krugman model the extensive margin is exclusively driven
by changes in the number of entering firms to the market, whereas in the Melitz
model also changes in the number of firms exporting to specific destinations play
26 Dixon et al. (2016) have argued that a fair comparison between the three models would
require an identical change in the volume of trade. As pointed out before, we argue that
empirical observable elasticities should be identical. The two do not correspond, because in
the Melitz model there are additional changes in the model leading to changes absorbed by
the fixed effects in a gravity estimation. Imposing equal changes in trade volumes would
likely imply in our model that the welfare effects under Melitz would become (much)
smaller than under Armington, since changes in the value of trade in the Melitz model
are almost 50% larger.
44
Journal of Global Economic Analysis, Volume 3 (2018), No. 2, pp. 1-68.
a role.
The trade margin decomposition is another way to examine the different mech-
anisms operative in the three models. Whereas in the welfare decomposition we
focused on variety and productivity effects, here we decompose trade into three
margins. In the Armington model only the intensive margin is operative, since
productivity of all firms from a certain country is identical and the number of firms
is not explicitly identified in this model. In the Ethier-Krugman model both the in-
tensive and extensive margins are operative. However, by absence of destination-
specific fixed costs the contribution of the number of firms to changes in the value
of trade is limited in this model. The extensive margin only consists of changes
in the number of producing firms. In the Melitz model all three margins are op-
erative. A reduction in iceberg trade costs raises trade along the intensive margin:
firms already exporting will export more when trade costs are falling. Trade rises,
however, also along the extensive margin. Lower trade costs enable more firms to
export. Finally, the value of trade falls with a reduction in trade costs along the
compositional margin: lower trade costs enables also the less-productive firms to
export and this will exert a negative influence on the value of exports. The com-
positional margin reflects that lower trade costs make it easier for firms to export
and therefore also the less productive firms can export. The reduction in average
exporter productivity leads to lower exporter sales. Other CGE-models with firm
heterogeneity do not focus on this decomposition of trade flows.
In the analysis we have worked with the assumption that labor is imperfectly
mobile between sectors. The question is what the influence is of this assumption
on the welfare ranking of the different models. To explore this question we have
replicated the simulations presented in this section varying the elasticity of trans-
formation of labor between sectors from 1 to 7. The results reported above are
based on an elasticity of transformation for the three types of labor of 5. Table 6
shows the change in world equivalent variation (WEV) for the experiments also
presented in Table 3 and Figure 1 displays the change in WEV for the Arming-
ton, Ethier-Krugman, and Melitz model for an identical change of 2% in global
iceberg trade costs. We get three main insights from the table and figure. First, the
relative welfare ranking in terms of models is robust to variation in the degree of
sluggishness of labor. We find that the welfare effect is largest for the Melitz model,
followed by the Ethier-Krugman model, and finally the Armington model. Second,
for lower values of the elasticity of transformation shocks to atcdi , a variable appear-
ing in the gravity equation, generate the same effect in different implementations
of the Melitz models, regardless of whether the shocks are implemented through a
change in iceberg or in fixed trade costs. For larger values small differences in the
change in world equivalent variation start to emerge.27 Third, Figure 1 shows that
27 This equivalence also holds for shocks to atcdi and calibration to either the tariff or trade
elasticity in the Ethier-Krugman model and the Armington model. However, for larger
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the difference in welfare effects rises somewhat with the degree of labor mobility.
As the elasticity of transformation rises, the WEV stays fairly constant for the Arm-
ington model, whereas it rises slowly though steady for the Ethier-Krugman and
Melitz model. This result can be explained from the fact that labor mobility has
stronger beneficial effects for the models featuring scale effects and love-of variety.
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Figure 1. Change in world equivalent variation (WEV) for different degrees of labour
mobility
Notes: The table displays the change in WEV for values of the elasticity of transformation of labor
across sectors varying between 1 and 7 of a 2% reduction in iceberg trade costs.
Source: Authors calculations with parsimonious firm heterogeneity model.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have proposed a setup to capture three trade models (Arming-
ton, Ethier-Krugman, and Melitz) in the standard trade framework of the GTAP
model by including demand, supply, and trade cost shifters. We have shown how
the expressions in the standard trade framework are adapted, outlined their imple-
mentation in the GTAP framework, provided intuition for the expressions, and
included a detailed derivation (in the appendix). Our framework does not re-
quire solving for additional pairwise variables like the cutoff productivity and the
mass of firms, keeping the dimensionality of the model limited. We have also ex-
tended the standard welfare decomposition in the GTAP framework adding terms
for changes in domestic and imported average productivity and numbers of vari-
degrees of labor mobility small differences appear between the welfare effects.
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eties.
We have presented the gravity equations in the different trade structures and
discussed ad valorem equivalents based on gravity estimates of trade policy mea-
sures. We have used these estimates to conduct experiments of reductions in ice-
berg and fixed trade cost reductions with a medium-sized model with 11 countries,
11 sectors, and 6 factors of production. The simulations show that the welfare ef-
fects are largest in the Melitz model, followed by the Ethier-Krugman, and Arming-
ton model, although the differences are modest. In our companion paper, Bekkers
and Francois (2018), we focus on the factors determining differences in outcomes of
counterfactual experiments in the different models. In that paper we show first that
the comparison of welfare effects across the models is sensitive to the calibration of
parameters in a simple single-sector two-country model without intermediate link-
ages.In particular, calibration can be such that the structural parameters are iden-
tical (the substitution elasticity and the shape parameter of the productivity distri-
bution) or such that the empirically observed parameters are identical (the trade or
tariff elasticity and the level of granularity of the firm size distribution). Second,
we show which modelling features matter most for the differences between mod-
els in the impact of multilateral trade liberalization on welfare in a medium-sized
model like in the current paper. As also shown in Bekkers and Romagosa (2018)
for the case of trade cost reductions in the framework of TTIP, welfare effects tend
to be magnified with stronger intermediate linkages and endogenous labor supply
and capital accumulation. In comparison to the work in the CGE-literature on firm
heterogeneity, such as Akgul et al. (2016) and Dixon et al. (2018) these conditional
results are new. Akgul et al. (2016) show that welfare effects in their model with
firm heterogeneity are much larger than in the model with Armington preferences
without an impact of other modelling features on this result. Dixon et al. (2018)
conduct experiments with firm heterogeneity in one of the 57 sectors, showing that
this generates larger welfare effects because of reallocation of resources towards
the firm heterogeneity sector which features scale effects.
Most CGE-models handle international trade with Armington preferences. Our
parsimonious and straightforward implementation of the three trade models in
the widely used Armington framework makes it relatively easy to incorporate the
three trade models into other CGE-models. In our approach the expressions for do-
mestic and importer demand and the price index only have to be extended using
demand, supply, and trade cost shifters. Our framework comes along with a rela-
tively easy calibration of parameters and baseline, requiring only tariff elasticities,
shape parameters of the firm size distribution, and import shares without needing
specific information about the size of fixed trade costs or markups.
Our current work could be extended into at least three directions. First, we
could impose country-specific values for the substitution elasticities and the trade
parameters, although this obviously would also require the estimation of country-
specific tariff/trade elasticities and firm size shape parameters. Second, we could
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extend our parsimonious setup with features addressed in the literature on firm
heterogeneity like endogenous unemployment, endogenous innovation, and multi-
national activity. Third, we could estimate the CET-parameters governing the de-
gree of labor immobility based on labor market data and or changes in the GTAP
data over time.
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Appendix A. Derivation Demand, Supply, and Trade Cost Shifter
In this section we derive the expressions for the demand, supply, and trade cost
shifter in the Ethier-Krugman and Melitz models. To do so we write the price index
in these two models, pagis , as defined in equation (7) as in the standard GTAP model
as in (4) and (6). The price index in the standard model is equal to the price index
in the Ethier-Krugman/Melitz model if we have the following expressions:
pirs
emis
=
tirstairs p
ci f
irs
cmir e
m
is
=
Mνi−1is ∫
ω∈Ωirs
pag,o (ω)1−σi dω
 11−σi (A.1)
pd,agiss
edis
=
tpis pibis
edisc
d
is
=
Mνi−1is ∫
ω∈Ωdiss
pag,o (ω)1−σi dω

1
1−σi
(A.2)
We will now elaborate on the RHS of (A.1)-(A.2) for the two models. This will then
give the expressions for tirs, esois , and c
so
is .
A.1 Ethier-Krugman Economy
To determine tirs, esois , and c
so
ir in the Ethier-Krugman model we rewrite the RHS
of equation (A.1), recognizing that all firms (and thus all prices) are identical in this
model:
tirstairs p
ci f
irs
cmir e
m
is
= M
νi−1
1−σi
is N
1
1−σi
ir p
o
irs (A.3)
Hence, we need to determine Nir and poirs in the model. To do so we combine the
markup equation, the free entry condition, and factor market equilibrium, starting
with the expression for firm demand.
Preferences as defined in equation (7) imply that a firm producing in country r
faces the following demand in country s (since firms are identical we omit a variety
or firm identifier):
oirs = (Mis)
νi−1
(
poirs
psois
)−σi
∑
ag
(
taso,agis p
so
is
pagis
)−ρi Eagis
pagis
(A.4)
poirs is the firm’s price corresponding with quantity oirs (exclusive of group-specific
taxes taso,agis ), p
so
is the price index of goods from source so (domestic or foreign), p
ag
is
the aggregate price index for end user ag and Eagis its expenditures. Profits can be
written as revenues minus costs:
piirs =
poirsoirs
tairs
− τirs
(
teirstpirbir pibir +
ptsirs
atsirs
)
oirs − airtpir pibir (A.5)
This expression for profit in (A.5) implies the following standard markup pricing
rule:
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poirs =
σi
σi − 1 tairsτirs
(
teirstpirbir pibir +
ptsirs
atsirs
)
(A.6)
Profits of a firm from country r can now be written as revenues divided by σi times
tairs minus fixed costs and equalized to zero by free entry:
piir =
S
∑
s=1
poirsoirs
σitairs
− airtpir pibir = 0 (A.7)
We can now determine the number of varieties produced in country r, Nir, based
on factor market equilibrium with qibir the quantity of input bundles from country
r: (
S
∑
s=1
τirsoirs + air
)
Nir = qibir (A.8)
We have to take into account the presence of transport costs, by rewriting physical
output inclusive of iceberg trade costs as follows based on the markup equation in
(A.6):
τirsoirs =
σi − 1
σi
poirsoirs
tpir pibi tairs
+
σi − 1
σi
poirsoirs
tpir pibir tairs
 1
teirstpirbir +
ptsirs
pibir a
ts
irs
− 1
 (A.9)
We can now combine equations (A.7)-(A.9) to solve for Nir:
Nir =
q˜ibir
σiair
(A.10)
We can now rewrite equation (A.3) as follows, using the expressions for poirs and
Nir in (A.6) and (A.10):
tirstairs p
ci f
irs
cmir e
m
is
= M
νi−1
1−σi
is
(
q˜ibir
σiair
) 1
1−σi σi
σi − 1 tairsτirs p
ci f
irs (A.11)
Equation (A.11) implies the expressions for tirs, cmir , and e
m
is in the main text.
A.2 Melitz Economy
The preferences defined in (7) imply the following expression for revenues of a
firm with productivity ϕ:
rirs (ϕ) = (Mis)
νi−1
(
poirs (ϕ)
psois
)1−σi
∑
ag
(
taso,agis p
so
is
pagis
)1−ρi
Eagis (A.12)
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A standard markup pricing rule follows from profit maximization:
poirs (ϕ) =
σi
σi − 1
tairsτirs p
ci f
irs
ϕ
(A.13)
Profits for sales from country r to s can be written as:
piirs (ϕ) = M
νi−1
is
(
poirs (ϕ)
psois
)1−σi
∑
ag
(
taso,agis p
so
is
pagis
)1−ρi Eagis
taso,agis tairsσ
− firstpir pibir (A.14)
We can now define a zero cutoff profit (ZCP) and free entry (FE) condition. The
ZCP dictates that a firm with a cutoff productivity level, ϕ∗irs, makes zero profit
ex post (so knowing its productivity and having already paid sunk entry costs).
Substituting the pricing equation (A.13) into the expression for profit in (A.14) and
solving for ϕ∗irs leads to:
ϕ∗irs =
σi
σi−1 tairsτirs p
ci f
irs(
σi firs pibir tairs
) 1
1−σi
∗
∑
ag
Mνi−1is
(
taso,agis p
so
is
Pagis
)1−ρi Mνi−1is (psois )σi−1 Eagis
taso,agis
 11−σi (A.15)
According to the free entry condition, expected profit before entry (ex ante) is equal
to the sunk entry costs:
S
∑
s=1
(1− Gir (ϕ∗irs))piirs (ϕ˜irs) = δenirtpir pibir (A.16)
ϕ˜irs is average productivity defined as:
ϕ˜irs =
 ∞∫
ϕ∗irs
ϕσ−1
gir (ϕ)
1− Gir
(
ϕ∗irs
)dϕ

1
σi−1
=
(
θi
θi − σi + 1
) 1
σi−1
ϕ∗irs (A.17)
The second equality follows from imposing a Pareto distribution for productivity
ϕ, as in equation (11).
Imposing the ZCP and rirs(ϕ1)rirs(ϕ2) =
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)σi−1
, the FE can be expressed as:
S
∑
s=1
(1− Gir (ϕ∗irs)) tpir pibir firs
((
ϕ˜irs
ϕ∗irs
)σi−1
− 1
)
= δenirtpir pibir (A.18)
Finally, we can rewrite the FE imposing the Pareto distribution and employing
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equation (A.17):
S
∑
s=1
(
κir
ϕ∗irs
)θ
firs
σi − 1
θi − σi + 1 = δenir (A.19)
Before defining the bilateral price in the Melitz model, we still need to derive an
expression for the number of varieties, Nirs. With a steady state of entry and exit,
the number of entrants, NEir, times the probability of successful entry, 1−Gir (ϕ∗irs),
is equal to the number of exiting firms, δNirs:
Nirs =
(1− Gir (ϕ∗irs)) NEir
δ
=
(
κir
ϕ∗irs
)θi NEir
δ
(A.20)
Combining the free entry condition with factor market equilibrium, enables us to
write the number entrants, NEir, as a function of the number of factor input bun-
dles, qibir :
NEir =
σi − 1
θiσi
q˜ibir
enir
(A.21)
We have now expressions for all the components featuring in the bilateral price,
defined in equation (A.1) and rewritten as follows:
pirs
emis
=
tirstairs p
ci f
irs
cmir e
m
is
= M
νi−1
1−σi
is N
1
1−σi
irs pirs (ϕ˜irs)
So, using the expression for Nirs in (A.20), for NEir in (A.21), for pirs (ϕ) in (A.13),
and for ϕ˜irs in (A.17), we can write:
pirs
emis
=
tirstairs p
ci f
irs
cmir e
m
is
= M
νi−1
1−σi
is
(
κir
ϕ∗irs
) θi
1−σi
(
σi − 1
θiσi
q˜ibir
δenir
) 1
1−σi σi
σi − 1
tairsτirs p
ci f
irs(
θi
θi−σi+1
) 1
σi−1 ϕ∗irs
(A.22)
Rearranging and substituting for ϕ∗irs from (A.15) gives after straightforward
reorganizing the following final expression for international flows:
pirs
esois
= γm,i
(
κθiir q˜
ib
ir
δenir
) 1
1−σi (
pci firs
) θi
σi−1
(
firtpir pibir
) θ+σ−1
(σ−1)2 ta
θi
σi−1+
θi−σi+1
(σi−1)
2
irs (τirs)
θi
σi−1
∗M
νi−1
1−σi
is
∑
ag
Mνi−1is
(
pagis
tam,agis p
m
is
)ρ−1 (
pmis
)σ−1 Eagis
tam,agis
−
θi−σi+1
(σi−1)
2
(A.23)
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And for domestic flows we get:
pd,agiss
edis
=
tpis pibis
edisc
d
is
= γm,i
(
κθiis q˜
ib
is
δenis
) 1
1−σi (
tpis pibis
) θi
σi−1+
θi+σi−1
(σi−1)
2
∗M
νi−1
1−σi
is
∑
ag
Mνi−1is
(
pagis
tam,agis p
m
is
)ρ−1 (
pmis
)σ−1 Eagis
tam,agis
−
θi−σi+1
(σi−1)
2
(A.24)
The expressions for esois , tirs, and c
so
ir in the main text follow from equations (A.23)-
(A.24). Comparing these two equations shows why the coefficients on tpir pibir are
different for imported and domestic flows: the impact through marginal costs in
production runs through pci firs for international flows.
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Appendix B. Number of Consumed Varieties
We start with the expression for the number of consumed varieties in the Melitz
model, Mis. Defining Ndiss as the number of domestic varieties in country s and Nirs
the number of varieties sold from r to s (also applying to intra-regional trade for
r = s), we can employ Mis = Ndiss +
S
∑
r=1
Nirs and the expression for Nirs in equation
(A.20) and for ϕ∗irs in (A.15) gives the following expression:
M
σi−1−θi(νi−1)
σi−1
is = γM,i ∗
{
κθiis q˜
ib
is
δenis
(
f diss p
ib
is
) θi
1−σi
(
pibis
)−θi ∗
∑
ag
(
pagis
tad,agis p
d
is
)ρi−1 (pdis)σi−1 Eagis
tad,agis

θi
σi−1
+
S
∑
s=1
κθiir q˜
ib
ir
δenir
(
firs pibir tairs
) θi
1−σi
(
tairsτirs p
ci f
irs
)−θi
∗
∑
ag
(
Pagis
tam,agis p
m
is
)ρi−1 (pmis)σi−1 Eagis
tam,agis

θi
σi−1 }
(B.1)
We first derive the percentage change of Mis for the Melitz model and then for
the Ethier-Krugman model. Hat differentiating the expression for Mmelis in equation
(B.1) gives:
vM̂melis =
S
∑
r=1
shareMirs
(
N̂Eir − θi
σi − 1
(
f̂irs + ̂tpir pibir + t̂airs)− θi (t̂airs + τ̂irs + p̂ci firs))
+
θi
σi − 1
S
∑
r=1
shareMirs∑
ag
pmis q
m,ag
is
∑
ag′
pmis q
m,ag′
is
{(ρi − 1)
(
P̂agis − ̂tam,agis )
+ (σi − ρi) p̂mis +
(
Êagis − ̂tam,agis )}
+ sharedMiss
(
N̂Eis − θi
σi − 1
(
f̂ diss +
̂tpis pibis)− θi ̂tpis pibis)
+
θi
σi − 1 share
dM
iss ∑
ag=
pdisq
d,ag
is
∑
ag′={s,p, f }
pdisq
d,ag′
is
{(ρi − 1)
(
P̂agis −
̂tad,agis )
+ (σi − ρi) p̂dis +
(
Êagis −
̂tad,agis )} (B.2)
With vi =
σi−1−θi(νi−1)
σi−1 .
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To write this in GEMPACK-notation we elaborate on the share, shareMirs, as fol-
lows:
shareMirs =
NEir
(
firstpir pibir tairs
) θi
1−σi
(
tairsτirs p
ci f
irs
)−θi (
pmis
)θi (Emis ) θiσi−1
sumMis + NEis
(
fiss pibis
) θi
1−σi
(
tpis pibis
)−θ (pdis)θ (Edis) θσ−1 (B.3)
With:
sumMis =
S
∑
u=1
NEiu
(
fiustpiu pibiutaius
) θi
1−σi
(
taiusτius p
ci f
ius
)−θi
(pmis )
θi (Emis )
θi
σi−1 (B.4)
Comparing equation (B.3) with the Melitz gravity equation in (44) shows that our
share term is equal to:
shareMirs =
virs
firstpir pibir
S
∑
u=1
vius
fiustpiu pibiu
+
vdiss
fisstpis pibis
(B.5)
By lack of information on the size of fixed costs, firs, we proxy shareMirs by the share
spent on imports from country r, thus implicitly assuming that the value of fixed
costs is equal in the different sourcing countries r. In GEMPACK-notation shareMirs
and sharedMiss are given by:
FORMULA (all,i,trad_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
SHRM(i,r,s) = VIMS(i,r,s)/(SUM(t,REG,VIMS(i,t,s))+VDM(i,s));
FORMULA (all,i,trad_COMM)(all,s,REG)
SHRD(i,s) = VDM(i,s)/(SUM(t,REG,VIMS(i,t,s))+VDM(i,s));
We can now write equation (B.2) in GEMPACK notation as follows, observing
that pm (i, s) is the producer price, inclusive of production taxes, corresponding
with ̂tpis pibis :28
EQUATION MMEL_EQ (all,i,trad_COMM)(all,s,REG)
varpi(i) * mmel(i,s) = SUM(r,REG,SHRM(i,r,s)
* (nne(i,r) - (theta(i)/(ESUBM(i) - 1)) * (fex(i,r,s)
+ [pm(i,r) - num] + tm(i,s) + tms(i,r,s)) - theta(i)
* (tm(i,s) + tms(i,r,s) + itc(i,r,s) + pcif(i,r,s) - num)))
+ (theta(i)/(ESUBM(i) - 1)) * (1 - SHRD(i,s))
* ((ESUBD(i)-1)*(priceDm(i,s)-num)
+ (ESUBM(i)-ESUBD(i))*(pim(i,s)-num) + (valueDm(i,s)-num)
- ESUBD(i)*tariffDm(i,s))
+ SHRD(i,s) * (nne(i,s) - (theta(i)/(ESUBM(i) - 1))
* [pm(i,s) - num] - theta(i) * (pm(i,s) - num))
+ (theta(i)/(ESUBM(i) - 1)) * SHRD(i,s)
* ((ESUBD(i) - 1) * (priceDd(i,s) - num)
+ (ESUBM(i) - ESUBD(i)) * (pm(i,s) - sshiftd(i,s)
- dshiftd(i,s) - num) + (valueDd(i,s) - num)
28 Domestic fixed trade costs, represented by the term f̂ diss in equation (B.2), are omitted
from the code, because we do not include the possibility to change domestic fixed costs.
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- ESUBD(i) * tariffDd(i,s));
Hat differentiating the expression for esois in the Ethier-Krugman model in equa-
tion (10) and recognizing that esois = − νi−1σi−1 Metkis , generates:
êsois = M̂
etk
is =
νi − 1
σi − 1 M̂
etk
is =
νi − 1
σi − 1
S
∑
s=1
q˜is
σiais
S
∑
u=1
q˜iu
σiaiu
̂˜qis (B.6)
Assuming like in the Melitz model that fixed costs are identical across countries,
we can proxy the share terms in equation (B.6) by gross output shares, SHGO(i,r),
defined as:
FORMULA (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)
SHGO(i,r) = VOM(i,r)/SUM(s,REG,VOM(i,s));
So the expression for M̂etkis in the Ethier-Krugman model in the code becomes:
EQUATION METK_EQ (all,i,trad_COMM)
metk(i) = SUM(s,REG,(SHGO(i,s) * nne(i,s)));
We switch between the Ethier-Krugman and Melitz expression for Mis with the
following equation.
EQUATION MH_EQ (all,i,trad_COMM)(all,s,REG)}
mh(i,s) = VARS(i) * {(1 - ETK(i)) * mmel(i,s) + ETK(i) * metk(i)};
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Appendix C. Equivalence Code
We check the equivalence of the Melitz model formulated with demand and
supply shifters with the Melitz model formulated with a larger set of equations
following from Melitz (2003). We do this in a model with a single sector and two
identical countries and with and without intermediate linkages.
To keep things simple we eliminate several institutional details from GTAP in
our two-country model with intermediate linkages. So we examine a model with-
out a transport sector, without import tariffs and export subsidies, without a sepa-
rate nest between domestic and imported goods and with only one group of agents,
private households. Imposing the general equilibrium condition that gross output
pibr qibr is equal to the value of exports to all destination countries s and using the
fact that the absence of tariffs and trade imbalances implies that expenditures Er
are equal to the value of gross output pibr qibr , gives the following general equilib-
rium condition:
pibr q
ib
r =
S
∑
s=1
(
prs
ps
)1−σ
pibr q
ib
r (C.1)
In a setting without intermediate linkages, the price and quantity of input bundles
are respectively equal to wages wr and quantity of labor Lr. The expressions for the
price index and the bilateral price are:
ps =
(
J
∑
i=1
p1−σrs
) 1
1−σ
(C.2)
prs =
tarstrscr pibr
es
(C.3)
Following the setup in the main text for the large multi-sector model gives the
following expressions for cr, trs and es.
cr = γm
(
κθr qibr
δenr
) 1
1−σ (
pibr
) θ−σ+1
σ−1 +
θ−σ+1
(σ−1)2 (C.4)
trs = τ
θ
σ−1
rs f
θ−σ+1
(σ−1)2
rs (C.5)
es =
(
pσ−1s pibs qibs
) θ−σ+1
(σ−1)2 (C.6)
Because of the absence of per unit transport services, we have included the marginal
cost term in pibr in cr instead of trs as in the main text.
Without intermediate linkages we solve equations (C.1)-(C.6) for pibr , ps, prs, cr
and es. With intermediate linkages we add the following two additional equilib-
rium equations implying that ps has to be solved simultaneously with the other
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variables:
pibr = w
βr
r P
1−βr
r (C.7)
pibs q
ib
s =
wsLs
βs
(C.8)
We assume that input bundles are a Cobb-Douglas aggregate over labor and inter-
mediates with intermediates identical to final goods.29 So with intermediates we
solve equations (C.1)-(C.8) for pibr , qibr , wr, pr, prs, cr and es.
We compare the Melitz model as formulated above with demand and supply
shifters in a symmetric two-country setting with the Melitz model formulated with
a full set of equilibrium equations. More specifically, we compare the Melitz gen-
eral setup model with the following set of equilibrium equations: an expression
for the price index; an expression for the number of varieties; a demand equation;
an expression for cutoff revenues; a markup pricing expression; and a zero cut-
off profit condition. The free entry condition is substituted in both the expression
for the number of varieties and the demand equation. This corresponds with the
following set of equations:
p1−σs =
S
∑
r=1
Nrs
θ
θ − σ+ 1 prs (ϕ
∗
rs)
1−σ (C.9)
Nrs =
(
κr
ϕ∗rs
)θr σ− 1
σθi
qibr
δenr
(C.10)
pibr q
ib
r =
S
∑
r=1
Nrs
θ
θ − σ+ 1rrs (ϕ
∗
rs) (C.11)
rij
(
ϕ∗ij
)
= prs (ϕ∗rs)
1−σ pσ−1s Es (C.12)
prs (ϕ∗rs) =
σ
σ− 1
τrs pibr
ϕ∗rs
(C.13)
rrs (ϕ∗rs) = σ frs pibr (C.14)
We solve equations (C.9)-(C.14) for ps, prs, Nrs, ϕ∗rs, pibr and rrs (ϕ∗rs). In the model
with intermediate linkages we add equations (C.7)-(C.8) and solve as well for the
qibr and wr.
We show that relative welfare changes as a function of relative changes in ice-
berg trade costs are identical employing the set of equations with demand and
29 With a Leontief specification, we would have the following expressions:
pZi = wiβ+ (1− β) Pi
Zi =
Li
β
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supply shifters and the fuller set of equations. We do this for different parameter
values, finding that the results are identical.
Calibration of the parameters is fairly arbitrary for this exercise showing equiv-
alence. Without loss of generality we set the parameters as described in the simu-
lations with the two-country model in Bekkers and Francois (2018), which is based
on the simulations presented Melitz and Redding (2013). In particular εv,ta = 4,
ξ = 3/4.25, fss = τss = enr = κr = 1, β = 0.9, and τrs and frs such that the domes-
tic spending share is 0.89 and the share of exporting firms equal to 0.18 (as in the
simulations presented in Melitz and Redding (2013)).
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Appendix D. Alternative Modelling of Ethier-Krugman
In this appendix we compare the way variety scaling is modelled in the Ethier-
Krugman model with the approach in Francois (1998). There are two differences.
First, Francois (1998) models variety scaling on the production side before trans-
portation costs are paid, whereas in our approach it is included after transport
costs are paid. Technically, Francois (1998) includes the variety scaling term in
ao, whereas we include it separately in import demand and domestic demand of
the four groups of agents. Second, the calculation of the variety scaling term has
changed a bit in the new approach. The reason is that the extent of variety scaling
is affected by transportation costs.
In Figure D1 we compare the effects of changes in iceberg trade costs in the
Ethier-Krugman model, using three approaches. First, the Francois (1998)-approach;
second, the approximate approach with the number of intermediates proportional
with the number of input bundles and the supply shifter in import and domes-
tic demand; and third, the theoretically correct approach with the number of in-
termediates nearly proportional with the number of input bundles (correcting for
the presence of transport costs). The figure shows that especially for trade cost
reductions, the welfare effects are larger with the approximate and theoretically
correct code than with the old code, though all three are virtually identical. So the
largest change is provoked by including the variety scaling term in a different place
and not by including additional transportation-cost related terms in calculating the
variety-scaling term. These findings provide support for using the approach with
the number of input bundles, nne (i, r) being a function only of qo (i, r), instead of
the more complicated expression also discussed in the main text.
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Figure D1. Comparison of simulation results with different treatment of variety scaling.
Notes: The figure displays world equivalent variation as a function of percentage change in iceberg
trade costs with trade liberalization in all sectors Ethier-Krugman structures in all sectors,
employing three approaches to model variety scaling, Francois (1998) with variety scaling before
transportation costs are paid, and variety scaling after transportation costs are paid based on an
approximation for nne and the exact expression for nne.
Source: Authors calculations with parsimonious firm heterogeneity model and with monopolistic
competition model of Francois (1998).
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Appendix E. Additional Tables
Table E1. Changes in the value of trade in millions of dollars along the different trade
margins (all regions)
Shock variable Model Regions Margins
Intensive Extensive Compositional Total
Total 34058 0 0 34058
EAA 15165 0 0 15165
EU 9684 0 0 9684
LatinAmer 863 0 0 863
MENA -2047 0 0 -2047
NAmerica 2973 0 0 2973
Iceberg trade costs Armington REE -627 0 0 -627
SEA 1542 0 0 1542
SOA 1653 0 0 1653
SSAROW -490 0 0 -490
USA 3431 0 0 3431
efta 1911 0 0 1911
Total 42080 5589 0 47668
EAA 16320 -29 0 16291
EU 11492 -1302 0 10190
LatinAmer 1201 -73 0 1128
MENA -983 -338 0 -1321
NAmerica 2804 7690 0 10494
Iceberg trade costs Ethier-Krugman REE 32 -126 0 -94
SEA 2165 345 0 2510
SOA 1868 -107 0 1761
SSAROW -153 201 0 48
USA 4993 -309 0 4684
efta 2340 -361 0 1979
Total 31742 59277 -41542 49477
EAA 12764 17408 -14395 15777
EU 8637 11376 -10489 9523
LatinAmer 903 1431 -1244 1090
MENA -1070 716 -878 -1232
NAmerica 1829 14324 -2660 13493
Iceberg trade costs Melitz REE -70 755 -744 -58
SEA 1604 3068 -2182 2490
SOA 1439 1856 -1647 1648
SSAROW -192 458 -213 54
USA 4148 5677 -4963 4862
efta 1751 2207 -2127 1831
Total -86636 898728 -724526 87568
EAA -13596 197346 -162817 20934
EU -22090 241575 -202180 17306
LatinAmer -1634 20218 -16839 1745
MENA -17918 98638 -82082 -1359
NAmerica -11368 106612 -65953 29292
Fixed trade costs Melitz REE -6775 43742 -36385 581
SEA -4257 42399 -34834 3307
SOA -1171 22449 -18627 2651
SSAROW -3725 23253 -18884 643
USA -927 57008 -47751 8328
efta -3175 45488 -38173 4140
Notes: Changes in the value of trade are decomposed for experiment 1 with uniform reductions in
iceberg and fixed trade costs
Source: Authors calculations with parsimonious firm heterogeneity model.
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